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After Tackett: Incomplete
Contracts for Post-Employment
Healthcare
Maria O’Brien Hylton*
I.

Introduction

This is a story about a union and a private sector employer
who repeatedly negotiated collective bargaining agreements
which referenced side contracts which provided retirees with
post-employment healthcare benefits. In the early decades of
their relationship neither the union nor the employer appear to
have given any thought to whether or not these retiree health
benefits in fact vested—i.e. were promised to retirees at no cost
for the remainder of their lives. By the 1980s1 and certainly the
1990s2 however, as health care costs soared and life expectancy
* Professor of Law, Boston University. I am indebted to Joseph Stuligross
of the United Steelworkers General Counsel’s Office, C. Michael Harper,
Susan Cancelosi, and to members of the AALS Section on Employee Benefits
and Executive Compensation and the American College of Employee Benefits
Counsel for comments and suggestions at various stages of this project. Lisa
Bothwell, Noel Chavez, Tyler Patterson and Christopher York provided
research assistance for which I am very grateful.
1. In 1980, life expectancy was at 73.7 years. While in 1970, life
expectancy at birth was at 70.8 years. Life Expectancy at Birth, at 65 Years of
Age, and at 75 Years of Age, by Race and Sex: United States, Selected Years
1900-2007, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2010),
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/2010/022.pdf [hereinafter Life Expectancy at
Birth]. While United States’ total health expenditures per capita tripled from
$356 in 1970 to $1,091 in 1980. Snapshots: Health Care Spending in the United
States & Selected OECD Countries, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr.
12,
2011),
http://kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/snapshots-health-carespending-in-the-united-states-selected-oecd-countries/.
2. In 1990, life expectancy was at 75.4 years. Life Expectancy at Birth,
supra note 1. By 1990 total health expenditures in the United States per capita
was at $2,810. Snapshots: Health Care Spending in the United States &
Selected OECD Countries, supra note 1. See also David P. Richardson, Trends
in Health Care Spending and Health Insurance, TIAA-CREF INST. 1, 2 (2008),
https://www.tiaa-
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expanded, both parties continued to regularly re-negotiate
agreements that were silent as to this critical term.3 With time,
predictably enough, the employer decided to eliminate this
increasingly expensive benefit; the union objected vigorously on
the ground that the benefit was promised to current retirees “for
life” and could not be unilaterally terminated. Recently, in M &
G Polymers v. Tackett,4 the Supreme Court considered the effect
of this silence and unanimously concluded that courts should not
construe ambiguous contract provisions in order to create
lifetime promises especially in the context of labor contracts
where obligations typically cease when the agreement
terminates.
This paper attempts to assess the Court’s decision and to
understand why both parties, in the face of increasing cost
cref.org/public/pdf/institute/research/trends_issues/tr120108c.pdf (“over the
past four decades, the growth of health care spending has outpaced overall
growth in the economy, with health care spending rising from about 5 percent
of GDP in 1960 to about 16 percent of GDP in 2006.”).
3. On July 20, 1994, a letter was circulated that claimed
[t]he Company shall provide health care benefits under the *
the Comprehensive Medical Benefits Program, Exhibit B-1,
the Dental Benefits for Employees and Dependents, Part V,
Section E of the Pension, Insurance and Service Award
Agreement dated July 20, 1994, to the extent that such
benefits shall be subject to the following limitations: 1) The
average annual company contributions to be paid for all
health care benefits per retired employee (including their
surviving spouse) who retires on or after May 1, 1994, shall
not exceed $11,700 for retirees (including surviving spouses)
under age 65 and $4,200 for retirees (including surviving
spouse) over age 65.
Exhibit 13 continued: Letter G at 1, Tackett v. M&G Polymers USA, LLC, 523
F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (No. 2:07-cv-00126-GLF-NMK) [hereinafter
Tackett I]. Nowhere in the limitations is there a reference to the vesting of
these health care benefits.
4. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 937 (2015)
(holding that under ordinary contract principles a collective bargaining
agreement was not shown to vest retirees with a right to lifetime contributionfree health care benefits since there was no presumption in favor of vested
retiree benefits in all collective bargaining agreements, there was no evidence
indicating that employers and unions in the industry customarily vested
retiree benefits, a limiting durational provision could not be disregarded, and
silence concerning the duration of retiree benefits did not permit an inference
that the parties intended the benefits to vest for life).
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pressure, came to the same strategic conclusion during the
course of bargaining over many years—i.e. that silence was
preferable to an explicit commitment. The union’s strategy was
clearly influenced by the Sixth Circuit’s longstanding decision in
Yard-Man5—a decision the Supreme Court essentially sidelines
in Tackett. Yard-Man was never widely adopted outside of the
Sixth Circuit and the employer in Tackett wisely gambled that
silence as to a critical term would force the Court to choose
between conventional and widely accepted rules of contract
interpretation and the nearly unique Yard-Man approach which
presumed that in the absence of other evidence, an agreement
that provided for retiree healthcare itself indicated an intent to
vest lifetime contribution-free benefits.
Tackett certainly can be understood as an instance in which
5. Int’l Union v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983). In Retirees
at Risk, Yard-Man is summarized:
The court, inferring into the situational context the relative
bargaining positions of the parties, ruled that retiree health
benefits extended beyond the expiration of the CBA. It
reasoned that retiree benefits were akin to status benefits
that “carry with them an inference that they continue so long
as the prerequisite status is maintained. Thus, when the
parties contract for benefits which accrue upon achievement
of retiree status, there is an inference that the parties likely
intended those benefits to continue as long as the beneficiary
remains a retiree.” Retirees had a justified expectation of
future welfare benefits, the court found, because retirement
benefits are “typically understood as a form of delayed
compensation or reward for past services” that would not
likely “be left to the contingencies of future negotiations.” In
other words, the retiree health benefits had already accrued
to retirees in exchange for previously sacrificed wages and
were not subject to later agreements. Having inferred these
points and considered all factors, the Sixth Circuit decided
that the specific benefits clause vested retiree benefits
interminably and ultimately trumped the routine three-year
duration clause pronounced for the CBA as a whole. Because
the agreement contained specific duration clauses for other
less significant benefits, the generalized duration clause
could not defeat the specialized benefits language into which
the court read an intent to vest.
Richard L. Kaplan, Nicholas J. Powers & Jordan Zucker, Retirees at Risk: The
Precarious Promise of Post-Employment Health Benefits, 9 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 287, 306-07 (2009).
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traditional rules of contract interpretation triumph over special
rules crafted for employee benefits negotiated in connection with
labor agreements. Tackett is also an implicit endorsement of the
anti-Yard-Man jurisprudence of most of the other federal
circuits.6 But, most important, Tackett provides yet more
evidence that as financial reporting requirements7 changed and
6. Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 378 (5th Cir. 2008) (The
Yard-Man inference “has never been accepted by this Court”); Senior v. NSTAR
Elec. & Gas Corp., 449 F.3d 206 (1st Cir. 2006) (claiming that all Yard-Man
instructs is that the Court should apply ordinary principles of contract
interpretation and that there is no presumption of vesting); UAW v. Skinner
Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 1999) (claiming that the Court does not agree
with Yard-Man and its progeny that there is a presumption of lifetime benefits
in the context of employee welfare benefits); Am. Fed’n of Grain Millers v. Int’l
Multifoods Corp., 116 F.3d 976 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that retiree welfare
benefits are generally not vested, and an employer can amend or terminate a
plan providing such benefits at any time) (citing Curtiss-Wright v.
Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 75, 78 (1995). In other cases, courts have followed
reasoning similar to the Sixth Circuit’s but have reached different conclusions.
E.g., Ryan v. Chromally Am. Corp., 877 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding
that plaintiffs' benefits did not vest under the accrual, vesting and funding
provisions of ERISA, the governing plan documents, or the collective
bargaining agreement between defendant and plaintiffs' union, and that the
governing plan documents unambiguously provided the right to terminate the
plan); Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 1512 (8th Cir. 1988)
(ruling that welfare plans did not vest as a matter of law and that the former
employees had the burden of proving that the parties intended that the
duration of benefits was not tied to the agreement that created them. The
former employees relied on a faulty summary plan description given them by
the former employer pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1022; however, the court held that
the former employees did not show significant reliance on the summary
sufficient to secure relief); Turner v. Local Union No. 302, Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that the retired employee
did not have a vested interest in the medical benefits provided by the
bargaining agreement between the unions and employers because the benefits
could be terminated, no representation was made as to the length of time the
benefits would be paid, and the trustees had the power to decrease benefits to
maintain the fund).
7. Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) No. 106 establishes
accounting standards for employers’ accounting for postretirement benefits
other than pensions, focusing principally on postretirement health care
benefits. Employers’ Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than
Pensions,
FIN.
ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS
B D.
(Dec.
1990),
http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum106.shtml. The Board's conclusions in
this Statement result from the view that a defined postretirement benefit plan
sets forth the terms of an exchange between the employer and the employee.
Id. In exchange for the current services provided by the employee, the
employer promises to provide, in addition to current wages and other benefits,
health and other welfare benefits after the employee retires. Id. It follows
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increased pressure on employers (and their unions) to reveal the
true costs associated with post-employment benefits, there were
multiple efforts to avoid full disclosure and the expected
backlash from shareholders. Only when rising costs and
longevity simply made retiree healthcare an unaffordable luxury
did employer ambiguity evaporate leaving retirees with few
protections.
Thus far, the Tackett story has not ended happily for
plaintiffs-retirees. This is by no means the first time however
that plaintiffs seeking to enforce claims for post-employment
health benefits have found themselves unable to do so.8 On the
contrary, the result in Tackett is consistent with a growing line
of cases that refuses to put much legal weight on oral and
written promises,9 employer custom and practice10 and even
from that view that postretirement benefits are not gratuities but are part of
an employee's compensation for services rendered. Id. Since payment is
deferred, the benefits are a type of deferred compensation. Id. The employer's
obligation for that compensation is incurred as employees render the services
necessary to earn their postretirement benefits. Id. From a financial
accounting perspective, in other words, incurred costs—including future
health care expenses of current employees—should be reflected in an
employer’s financial results when that employer assumes responsibility for
those costs. Kaplan et al., supra note 5, at 297. Notwithstanding the
theoretical correctness of this approach, the result was a major increase in the
annual cost reported by employers for their operations, in some cases, as much
as five to ten times the cost on a pay-as-you-go basis. Id.
8. See generally Kaplan et al., supra note 5.
9. Cherry v. Auburn Gear, Inc., 441 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that
“lifetime” benefits extended only so long as the collectively bargained insurance
agreement remained in effect); UAW v. Rockford Powertrain, Inc., 350 F.3d
698 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that although the SPD purportedly conferred
lifetime benefits on its employees, the employer’s right to modify and its
explicit affirmation of such ability in the reservation-of-rights clause could not
be read as promising vested healthcare benefits); Hughes v. 3M Retiree Med.
Plan, 281 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that the benefits booklet cited by
plaintiffs was not the correct SPD, as the booklet referred participants over
age sixty-five to a separate “Med-Supp Plan” brochure that governed plaintiff’s
plan and contained no language even remotely suggestive of vesting.
Furthermore, both documents contained reservation clauses reserving the
right to amend or discontinue benefits).
10. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996) (holding that lying to
employees in the context of benefits administration violates the fiduciary
obligation); see Vallone v. CNA Fin. Corp., 375 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2004)
(holding that under Varity and other Seventh Circuit precedents, “the
employer must have set out to disadvantage or deceive its employees . . . in
order for a breach of fiduciary duty” claim to succeed).
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arguments about reliance11 in light of the enormous (and
sometimes unexpected burden) retiree healthcare costs present
for employers.
One might ask why retiree health insurance matters much
at all. The simplest response is that, for those over age 65, it is
often a nice add-on to Medicare coverage. But, for retirees under
the age of 65, alternative sources of health insurance are often
expensive if available at all. When retiree health coverage is
eliminated for a current retiree, the retiree must consider his
options.
As Professor Cancelosi has noted:
Depending on the reasons for retirement, an
individual may not be willing or able to return to
full-time employment to obtain active employee
coverage. Even if someone is both willing and
able, an older person’s chances of returning to a
comparable position are limited. Employmentbased coverage, once lost, may well be gone
forever.12
11. Rockford Powertrain, 350 F.3d at 705-06 (claiming that it was
impossible for the plaintiffs to have relied on their employer’s statements in
making their retirement decisions, because “plaintiffs admit in their brief that
the statements at issue were made ‘during exit interviews after the retirees
made their decisions to retire’”); Frahm v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of
U.S., 137 F.3d 955, 961 (7th Cir. 1998) (claiming “in federal law, a person
cannot rely on an oral statement, when he has in hand written materials
disclosing the truth”); In re Unisys Corp. Retiree Med. Benefit “ERISA” Litig.,
57 F.3d 1255 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that an unambiguous reservation-of-rights
clause in the SPD eviscerated the reasonableness of plaintiff-retirees’ reliance
on a benefits administrator’s oral interpretation of the plan that conflicted with
the SPD).
12. Susan E. Cancelosi, The Shifting Focus of Federal Intervention in
Retiree Health Benefits, 13 NEV. L.J. 759, 763-65 (2013) (citations omitted).
Cancelosi goes on to state:
Without employer-provided insurance, early retirees find
themselves in a particularly difficult position. Adults who
are neither age sixty-five nor disabled currently do not enjoy
good alternatives to employer-provided health benefits.
Group health insurance through one's work does not
discriminate on the basis of health status; all similarly
situated employees are similarly eligible for coverage. The
same applies to retiree health plans sponsored by an
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As others have suggested,13 Tackett can easily be described
as a “win” for traditional rules of contract interpretation.
Indeed, as Justice Scalia pointed out during oral argument:
You know, the nice thing about a contract case of
this sort is you can’t feel bad about it. Whoever
loses deserves to lose. [Laughter] I mean, this
thing is obviously an important feature. Both
sides knew it [the issue of vesting] was left
unaddressed, so, you know, whoever loses
deserves to lose for casting this upon us when it
could have been said very clearly in the contract.
Such an important feature. So I hope we’ll get it

employer. Eligibility for coverage under such plans depends
on retiree status, not health conditions.
Individual
insurance, on the other hand, historically has come with no
such protections, and insurers have routinely denied
applications by those whom the companies perceive as poor
risks. Because health declines with age, those old enough to
qualify for retirement –early or normal – often fall into the
poor risk category. Even if an early retiree can find an
insurer willing to issue individual coverage, the cost may
outstrip what the individual can afford. . . . The only
remaining
alternative
is
government-provided
or
government-paid care, such as that available through
Medicare and Medicaid for certain parts of the population.
But healthy, early retirees historically have not qualified for
either of the safety net programs.
Id. at 763-65.
13. Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund v. Caddo Sheet
Metal, LLC, No. 1:14-CV-858, 2015 WL 4032037, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 30, 2015)
(citing to Tackett which required it to interpret the CBA “according to ordinary
principles of contract law”); Gray v. Levi Strauss & Co., No.3:14CV634-DPJFKP, 2015 WL 756747, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 23, 2015) (quoting Tackett:
“[Courts] interpret collective-bargaining agreements . . . according to ordinary
principles of contract law. . . . ”); Bd. of Trs. of the Plumbers v. R. & T. Schneider
Plumbing Co., No.1:13-CV-858, 2015 WL 4191297, at *10 (S.D. Ohio July 10,
2015) (quoting Tackett in order to establish that interpreting collectivebargaining agreements must be done according to ordinary principles of
contract law); Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati Shaper Indep. Union, No.1:14-CV296, 2015 WL 1468464, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2015) (quoting relevant
language to establish that collective-bargaining agreements should be
interpreted using ordinary principles of contract law).
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right, but, you know, I can’t feel bad about it.14
The union, in briefs filed since Tackett was remanded to the
Sixth Circuit, insists that the decision stands for nothing more
than the position that courts should not grant judgment for
retirees on the basis of ambiguous contract language alone.15
The longstanding relationship between the parties here
may help explain the peculiar silence. M & G was a party to
both a collective bargaining agreement and a related pension
and insurance agreement which provided for retiree health
coverage.16 Certain employees were eligible for employer paid
14. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21-22, M&G Polymers USA, LLC v.
Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015) (No. 13-1010). Justice Breyer responded by
noting that “[w]ell, you know, the workers who discover they’ve been retired
for five years and don’t have any health benefits might feel a little bad about
it.” Id. at 22.
15. “Tackett cites Litton which holds that post-expiration obligations may
arise from ‘express or implied’ CBA terms. Nor does Tackett hold that general
duration clauses automatically trump specific promises of post-expiration
retiree healthcare. Tackett rejects presumptions and holds that CBAs are
subject to the ‘ordinary principles of contract law’ and ‘the parties’ intentions
control.’” Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 20, M&G Polymers USA, LLC v.
Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015) (No.12-3329).
16. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 931 (2015).
Cancelosi encapsulates the fragile position of pre-65 year old retirees:
Employment-based health plans for retirees and their
dependents cover at least fifteen million individuals in the
United States. Retiree health insurance includes plans for
both early retirees and Medicare-eligible retirees. Plans for
early retirees—in general, those at least age fifty-five but not
yet sixty-five—typically provide primary health insurance,
often simply a continuation of active employee coverage;
plans for Medicare-eligible retirees are secondary to
Medicare and provide wrap-around coverage. For both
groups, employment-based coverage is important. For early
retirees, it is critical because they typically have few, if any,
alternatives to employer-sponsored plans.
In fact,
individuals with a choice rarely retire before Medicare
eligibility unless they qualify for retiree health benefits. For
Medicare-eligible retirees, the supplemental insurance
available through employers often is both less expensive and
more comprehensive than what private Medicare
supplemental policies (often referred to as "Medigap" plans)
offer.
When an employer reduces or terminates that
supplemental coverage, the costs shift to retirees, who may
not have the resources to adapt easily to new financial
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demands.
Cancelosi, supra note 12, at 759-61. Kaplan explains the options that retirees
possess when they are not eligible for Medicare due to being under 65 years of
age. Kaplan claims:
One such option is health insurance through a working
spouse . . . . A second option is obtaining Medicare as a
disabled person prior to reaching age sixty-five. Someone
who receives Social Security disability payments for twentyfour months is eligible for Medicare, regardless of age . . .
.Three more generally applicable options for retirees who are
not yet eligible for Medicare include the following: 1) continue
their former employer’s health insurance under the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985
(COBRA), 2) purchase health insurance in the individual
market, or 3) utilize a health savings account after
retirement . . . . [N]one of these three options adequately
addresses the problem of early retirees who have lost their
employer-sponsored retiree health benefits.
Kaplan et al., supra note 5, at 334-36.
Currently, Medicare is the source of health insurance for nearly 45 million
Americans-mainly seniors ages 65 and older, but also 7 million younger adults
with permanent disabilities. Medicare Now and in the Future, HENRY J.
KAISER FAM. FOUND., (Oct. 1, 2008), http://kff.org/health-reform/issuebrief/medicare-now-and-in-the-future/. Before Medicare was signed into law
in 1965, about half of all seniors lacked hospital insurance. Id. Today,
virtually all people ages 65 and over are covered by Medicare. Id. In 1966,
enrollment in the Medicare program was less than half of what it is today, at
19.1 million and none enrolled through permanent disabilities. Enrollment in
Medicare Program From 1996 to 2014, by Type of Beneficiary, STATISTA,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/237045/us-medicare-enrollment-figures/
(last visited Aug. 25, 2015). In 1970, some 7.1 billion U.S. dollars were spent
on the Medicare program in the United States. Total Medicare Spending from
1970
to
2014,
STATISTA,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/248073/distribution-of-medicare-spendingby-service-type/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2015). While in 2013, that figure had
risen to 581.7 billion U.S. dollars. Id. Cancelosi puts these figures into
perspective, claiming that,
[T]he cost of retiree health benefits weights the scale against
their maintenance. One study concluded that the cost of
providing
employment-based
health
benefits
to
retirees in 2010 would increase six percent for pre-sixty-five
retirees and four percent for Medicare-eligible retirees,
matching prior years' increases. That translates to a perperson cost of $7,596 per early retiree and $3,840 for the
Medicare-eligible retiree, as compared to $5,184 per active
employee for single coverage. Even though employers have
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retiree health coverage, subject to certain caps. The trial court
found (and this issue was not before the Supreme Court) that
the M & G retirees were not subject to caps as they were never
adopted at the location owned by M & G Polymers.17 The
collective bargaining agreement was silent as to the ability of
the employer to make changes to retiree health care coverage;
however, the labor agreement was subject to renegotiation every
three years as was typical in the industry.18 The Tackett
largely dealt with this problem by shifting costs to retirees,
10% of large employers surveyed in 2006 predicted that they
were "very" or "somewhat" likely to terminate coverage
altogether for future retirees, with another 2% predicting
that they were "very" or "somewhat" likely to terminate
coverage for current retirees. A 2010 survey similarly found
that ten percent of companies with existing retiree health
plans were "planning to exit, and 20% are seriously
considering this option for the future." An early 2011 study
reported that almost 60% of surveyed large employers
currently offering retiree plans were "rethinking" their
programs for 2012 or 2013.
Cancelosi, supra note 12, at 768-69.
17. Tackett v. M&G Polymers USA, LLC, 853 F. Supp. 2d 697, 718 (S.D.
Ohio 2012) [hereinafter Tackett II]. The plaintiff employees were divided into
five different sub-classes. The District Court ruled that cap letter applicability
was only directed at future employees, and not directly beneficial to sub-classes
one through four. “ [T]he trial evidence places the previously ambiguous Letter
of Understanding 2003-6 into its proper context as a going-forward document
applicable to individuals in Subclass Five and not a document that also speaks
to and clarifies the meaning of prior agreements governing Subclasses One
through Four.” Id. at 717. Further, “ [T]he document’s context teaches this
Court that application of Letter of Understanding 2003-6 to the plaintiffs in
the first four subclasses was a unilateral move by M&G to unlawfully
circumvent binding agreements to obtain economic advantages.” Id.
18. Founded in 1942, the United Steelworkers union is North America’s
largest industrial union with 1.2 million members and retirees. About Us,
UNITED STEELWORKERS, http://www.usw.org/union/mission (last visited July 6,
2015). There are more than 1,800 local unions throughout Canada, the United
States and the Caribbean. One Member, One Vote, UNITED STEELWORKERS,
http://www.usw.org/union/mission/one-member-one-vote (last visited Oct. 7,
2015). The United Steelworkers represent workers in a diverse range of
industries, including atomic, chemical, education, energy and utilities, health
care, manufacturing, metals (steel, aluminum, etc.), mining, oil, paper and
forestry, pharmacies and pharmaceuticals, public employees, rubber (tires,
etc.), transportation, and varied work places. Our Industries and Work Place,
UNITED STEELWORKERS, http://www.usw.org/union/mission/industries (last
visited Oct. 7, 2015). From the Court record, it is clear that the United
Steelworkers union had a practice of re-negotiating contracts every three
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litigation began when the employer notified the union through a
letter in 2006 that it intended to begin charging retirees for a
portion of their health care and the employees responded by
arguing they had a vested right to free retiree health care for
life.19 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
dismissed the employees’ complaint for failure to state a claim20
but the Sixth Circuit reversed and in so doing relied heavily on
its own precedent in International Union, United Auto,
Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v.
Yard-Man, Inc.21 While Yard-Man guided decision making in
years.
The first Insurance, Medical, Pension Disability Income and
Supplemental Unemployment Benefits for Hourly Rated Employees packet was
effective beginning May 15, 1991. Defendant’s Exhibit 1 at 2-3, Tackett I. The
next claims that effective July 20, 1994 the new terms of the benefits would
begin. Defendant’s Exhibit 3 at 2, Tackett I. Then again on May 9, 1997, the
Company issued a letter claiming that it would provide health care benefits
under the Comprehensive Medical Benefits Program . . . . with the aforesaid
limitations would become effective that day. Defendant’s Exhibit 4 at 2,
Tackett I. Following that agreement, there was another on November 6, 2000
to last until November 6, 2003 between M&G Polymers USA, LLC and United
Steelworkers union to continue the benefits. Defendant’s Exhibit 7 at 2,
Tackett I.
19. Tackett II, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 716-20.
20. Tackett I, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 691 (“Count I of the amended complaint
targets ‘specified lifetime health care benefits,’ and the specified benefits
include sharing costs. The retirees are entitled to an employer contribution
toward health benefits, but they must pay premium contributions; there is
simply no contractual right to contribution-free health benefits . . . . The
company’s right to terminate benefits for retiree’s failure to contribute is
implicit. Therefore, the evidence before this Court indicates that because the
caps scheme has continued to apply, Defendants are correct in asserting that
there is no breach of the CBA.”).
21. Int’l Union v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983) (affirming
the district court’s holding that the retirees were entitled to continued benefits,
but reversed the holding that appellant could not substitute cash value for the
annuities). Yard-Man urges that
[A] general durational clause which provided that the
collective bargaining agreement should remain in
force until June 1, 1977 demonstrates an intent that
all benefits described in the agreement also terminate
at that date. We do not agree. The clause does not
specifically refer to the duration of benefits. The
persuasive considerations we have discussed
demonstrate that retiree benefits were intended to
outlive the collective bargaining agreement’s life and
outweigh any contrary implications derived from a
routine duration clause terminating the agreement

11

328

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:2

these kinds of cases in the Sixth Circuit since 1983, very
different approaches to dealing with contracts that lacked
“important feature[s]”22 developed in the other federal circuits.
generally. Such an intent takes precedence over a
non-specific, general clause.
Id. at 1482-83.
22. Transcript of Oral Argument at 18-22, M&G Polymers USA, LLC v.
Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015) (No. 13-1010). The oral argument reflects this
frustration of leaving vesting silent:
Justice Alito: This certainly can’t be something that didn’t
occur to the employer or to the union. Why did they choose
to leave it silent? Why did they choose not to address it
expressly?
Ms. Ho: I think one could consider that they didn’t express it
directly or one could read the contract as saying there simply
is no—silence says there is no promise of vesting here,
because that is an extraordinary obligation for a company to
take on.
Justice Ginsburg: How about “Retirees will receive health
benefits as long as they are eligible for an receiving a monthly
pension”? Doesn’t that sound like as long as they’re getting
the pension, they will get health benefits?
Ms. Ho: No, Your Honor. Again, read in conjunction with
either the express clause in this case or the background rule
that the terms expire with the agreement, that doesn’t
indicate that those—those extend. And I think what—what
the Sixth Circuit has done, and it did in this case, it
instructed this Court that the mere fact that the retiree
healthcare benefits were tied to receipt of a pension was
sufficient to indicate vesting. I think that essentially undoes
what Congress did in saying you—you have to vest in
pension; you don’t have to vest in the welfare context. The
Sixth Circuit essentially puts those things—
Justice Scalia: Well, I don’t think it’s reversing that. I think
it’s—it’s an argument of—of contractual expression,
contractual intent. It says if you tie the continuing receipt of
health benefits to the continuing receipt of retirement
benefits, and if you know that retirement benefits survive the
termination of the contract, right? You acknowledge that.
Ms. Ho: The vesting.
Justice Scalia: It seems to suggest that—that health benefits
continue as long as retirement benefits do. Now, I mean,
maybe there are other indications, but that one certainly
seems to—seems to tie health benefits to retirement benefits.
Ms. Ho: I don’t think so, Your Honor. Because I think one
con—one consequence of that is essentially no matter what
the parties contract or agree to, you’re always going to have
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vesting, even though it’s the exception and not the rule,
simply by tying the healthcare benefits to—to retirement
status.
Justice Ginsburg: Why do you have to—why do you have to
do that? If you want to treat them as separate, treat them as
separate. Don’t tie them together. There was nothing that
required these two to be tied together.
Ms. Ho: Well, Your Honor, I think the practical reason for—
for linking those two is not to indicate vesting, but to ensure
that the recipient is—is actually retired for purposes of
receiving the benefits.
Justice Kennedy: Well, I thought it was your position that
whatever might be the outcome of these questions, the Sixth
Circuit didn’t think that that was the right analysis, that the
Sixth Circuit didn’t think the result could be reached without
imposing the presumption of your argument, and so
instructed the district court. And that’s the issue before us.
Ms. Ho: That’s correct, Your Honor. And the district court—
and the district court made clear on remand, and the Sixth
Circuit in the second appeal, in Tackett II, explicitly
approved, and the word the Sixth Circuit used was
“presumption,” that the district court decided correctly in
applying the presumption to this case.
Justice Ginsburg: I thought that the district court on remand
said it would have come out the same way anyway. They said
there are no facts that would defeat this same conclusion.
Ms. Ho: Correct, Your Honor. And I—and I think that’s an
important response to what Justice Sotomayor was pointing
out earlier about the fact that there was a trial here. I think
that—that language makes clear that the trial here was
about what—what vested, and that’s the district judge
making clear that whatever facts there had been, it would
have reached the same conclusion about vesting, which is the
only issue before this Court based on the Sixth Circuit’s
directive, as Justice Kennedy was pointing out, to apply
Yard-Man and to apply the Yard-Man presumption.
Justice Scalia: You know, the nice thing about a contract case
of this sort is you can’t feel bad about it. Whoever loses
deserves to lose.
(Laughter.)
Justice Scalia: I mean, this thing is obviously an important
feature. Both sides knew it was left unaddressed, so, you
know, whoever loses deserves to lose for casting this upon us
when it could have been said very clearly in the contract.
Such an important feature. So I hope we’ll get it right, but,
you know, I can’t feel bad about it.
(Laughter.)
Justice Breyer: Well, you know, the workers who don’t
discover they’ve been retired for five years and don’t have any
health benefits might feel a little bad about it.
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Indeed, outside of the Sixth Circuit, most courts rejected YardMan and its emphasis on the context in which labor negotiations
took place in favor of the more conventional contract analysis of
the sort Justice Scalia other members of the Court focused on in
Tackett.23
This paper seeks to explain the odd silence in both the
collective bargaining agreements and the pension and insurance
agreements about whether or not free-to-retirees retiree health
benefits were vested. The parties’ long shared history makes
impossible a conclusion that it was simply a mistake that this
important issue was never addressed. On the contrary, a
detailed review of the relationship between M & G Polymers and
the Steelworkers Union suggests that for a long time both
parties believed they were both better off leaving the issue
unaddressed. Both the union and M & G were able to avoid the
Ms. Ho: And—and Your Honor, I—I agree.
Justice Breyer: I’m taking sides, but I want to—
(Laughter.)
Justice Breyer: I mean, what I’ve listened to sort of drives me
to the conclusion where you started, decide these things
without any presumption, period. Ordinary contract. Go
read the contract. Where it’s ambiguous, Judge, ask them for
extrinsic evidence if they want to present it. Decide it like
any other case. I started there. Maybe I’ve heard something
that should change my mind. I often do change it in oral
argument, but I haven’t yet.
Id.
23. The Sixth Circuit approached the issue of whether retiree insurance
benefits continue beyond the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement
by looking at the intent of the parties. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d at 1479. The court
then looked to the explicit language of the collective bargaining agreement for
clear manifestations of intent. Id. The Court then analyzed the collective
bargaining agreement using
[B]asic rules of [contract] construction” to determine that
since “[t]he [duration] clause does not specifically refer to the
duration of benefits . . . . retiree benefits were intended to
outline the collective bargaining agreement’s life and
outweigh any contrary implications derived from a routine
duration clause terminating the agreement generally. Such
an intent takes precedence over a non-specific, general
clause.
Id. at 1482-83.
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reckoning that FAS 10624 would have required of them. Both
gambled that when push came to shove and they could no longer
avoid confronting the enormous cost free retiree health care
represented, their “silence” could be used advantageously.
II. The Mysterious Silence in Tackett
A.

Tackett—Years of Strategic Silence

Before M & G Polymers employees were represented by the
Steelworkers, the International Union of the United Rubber,
Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC
(the “URW”) represented M & G workers and employees of its
corporate predecessors for decades.25 The URW merged with the
Steelworkers in 1995.26 It appears as though free retiree health
benefits were first offered to employees/union members in
1950.27 Following years of relatively stable cost and mortality
24. Financial Accounting Statement No. 106 (FAS 106) requires
companies to accrue the cost of retiree health benefits and to record a liability
for unfunded retiree medical costs explicitly on their financial statements,
effective beginning for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1992. EMP.
BENEFIT
RESEARCH
INST.,
RETIREE
HEALTH
BENEFITS
(2005),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/fundamentals/2009/26_RetireeHlth_HEALTH_Funds-2009_EBRI.pdf. FAS 106 applies to current and future
retirees, their beneficiaries, and qualified dependents.
25. The United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum Plastic Workers of America was
founded on September 12, 1935, in Akron Ohio, the then “Rubber Capital of
the World” and former home base for most of the major tire and rubber
companies. THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED RUBBER, CORK, LINOLEUM PLASTIC
WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, CLC, UNITED STEEWORKERS,
http://uswlocal878l.com/page4.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). In 1960, the
URW, at its peak, had close to 200,000 members. Kenneth N. Gilpin, Rubber
Workers’ Union Acts to Merge with Steelworkers, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 1995),
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/13/business/rubber-workers-union-acts-tomerge-with-steelworkers.html. By 1995, at the time the URW merged with
the United Steelworkers of America, membership had shrunk to 94,000
members. Id.
26. Our
History,
UNITED
STEELWORKERS
LOCAL
2003,
http://www.usw2003.org/history.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2015); Rubber and
Steel Workers Consolidate Union, WARDSAUTO (Aug. 1, 1995),
http://wardsauto.com/news-amp-analysis/rubber-and-steel-workersconsolidate-unions.
27. It appears that the “1950 Pension Plan of the Company” began the
company’s practice of providing welfare benefits. The company and the union
would negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement approximately every
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experience, the cost of retiree health care began to increase in
the 1980s.28 As others have noted,29 the increases in the cost of
healthcare, especially for retirees, created several problems for
old line manufacturing employers who often had more retirees
than active workers.30
three years. They also negotiated a series of Master Pension, Insurance and
Service Award Agreements with every CBA negotiation. Individual plants
could adopt the agreement in one of three possible ways: first, some plants
directly participated in the “master bargaining” with the employer and became
a party to the Master Agreement itself. Second, some plants separately
adopted “me to” agreements that were identical to the Master Agreement.
And, third, some plants adopted “me too with exceptions” agreements. Joint
Appendix, M&G Polymers, LLC v. Tackett, 2014 WL 3746809 at *8-*23 (No.
13-1010) (July 17, 2014). Basically the governing insurance agreements
created a point system for employees based on age and years of service
requirements. Exhibit A at 3-4, Tackett I. Employees whose age and years of
continuous service at the time of retirement equaled ninety-five or more points
received a full company contribution toward the cost of benefits. Id.
Employees with less than 95 points at the time of retirement received reduced
benefits. Retiree spouses and surviving spouses were entitled to the same
benefits until death or remarriage. Id.
28. David Blumenthal et al., Health Care Spending—A Giant Slain or
Sleeping?,
369:26
NEW
ENG.
J.
MED.
2551,
2552
(2013),
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/cutler/files/nejmhpr1310415.pdf
(claiming
that real per capita increases in health costs averaged 5.5% in the 1980s);
Jonathan Cohn, Cause for Concern, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 21, 2014),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/117452/rising-health-care-costs-what-itmeans-economy-obamacare (noting a quick increase in healthcare costs in the
1980s and in the early 2000s); U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, supra note 1 (attributing the spike in healthcare costs in the late
1980s to the United States’ accelerated growth rate).
29. Philip Klein, Health Care Spending Spikes at Fastest Rate Since 1980
in First Quarter of Obamacare, WASH. EXAMINER (Apr. 30, 2014),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/health-care-spending-spikes-at-fastestrate-since-1980-in-first-quarter-of-obamacare/article/2547891 (referencing the
fact that health care spending grew at a ten percent rate in the third quarter
of 1980); James Lubitz et al., Three Decades of Health Care Use by the Elderly,
1965-1998,
HEALTH
AFFAIRS,
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/20/2/19.full (last visited Oct. 7, 2015)
(detailing the spike in the oldest old).
30. Take, for example, General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler. GM could not
survive with continuing losses and associated loss of liquidity, and without the
governmental funding it had been receiving. In re GMC, 407 B.R. 463, 474
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). Historically, GM was one of the best performing
Original Equipment Manufacturers (“OEM”) in the U.S. market. Id. at 476.
But with the growth of competitors with far lower cost structures and
dramatically lower benefit obligations, GM’s leadership position in the U.S.
began to decline. Id. At least as a result of that lower cost competition and
market forces in the U.S. and abroad (including jumps in the price of gasoline;
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As the cost pressures mounted on employers, the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) acted in 1990 and again in
2006 to increase transparency about the true cost of retiree
health care and other post- employment benefits. First, in 1990,
the FASB began requiring private sector employers to disclose
the projected cost of future retiree health care benefits.31 Rule
106 represented a dramatic departure from prior accounting
practices. As the Board explained shortly before Rule 106 went
into effect:
The Board’s conclusions in this Statement result
from the view that a defined postretirement
benefit plan sets forth the terms of an exchange
between the employer and the employee. In
exchange for the current services provided by the
employee, the employer promises to provide, in
addition to current wages and other benefits,
health and other welfare benefits after the
employee retires. It follows from that view that
postretirement benefits are not gratuities but are
part of an employee’s compensation for services
rendered. Since payment is deferred, the benefits
are a type of deferred compensation.
The
employer’s obligation for that compensation is

a massive recession (with global dislocation not seen since the 1930s); a
dramatic decline in U.S. domestic auto sales; and a freeze-up in consumer and
commercial credit markets), GM suffered a major drop in new vehicle sales and
in market share—from 45% in 1980 to a forecast 19.5% in 2009. Id. Another
factor that contributed to GM’s bankruptcy was the fact that the company had
obligations to an estimated 500,000 retirees. Id. at 474. As of March 31, 2009,
GM employed approximately 235,000 employees worldwide; that is less than
half of the amount of retirees. Id. at 475. Likewise, Ford was in a similar
position reporting that they were “hemorrhage[ing] cash in the the third
quarter.” Dan Carney, Ford Better Positioned to Ride out Recession, NBC
NEWS (Nov. 17, 2008), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/27723139/ns/businessautos/t/ford-better-positioned-ride-out-recession/#.VafuWu3BzGc.
Ford
posted a $129 million loss in the third quarter and said it would eliminate
another 2,260 jobs. Id. Ford, though, did not receive assistance through
T.A.R.P. and sold off its Jaguar and Land Rover operations in order to gain
cash during the recession. Meanwhile, both GM and Chrysler accepted
T.A.R.P. assistance.
31. Summary of Statement No. 106, FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD.
(Dec. 1990), http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum106.shtml.
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incurred as employees render services necessary
to earn their postretirement benefits.32
FAS 106 essentially required non-governmental employers
to incorporate into current financial statements the future costs
associated with providing retiree health care. The result was a
dramatic increase in reported costs.33 It is important to note that
the real, out of pocket costs to employers were also increasing at
this time as retirees benefited from often costly improvements
in medical technology that led to longer lifespans and greater
demand for medical care in retirement.34
32. Id.
33. See, e.g, Anna M. Rappaport & Carol H. Malone, Adequacy of
Employer-Sponsored Retiree Health Benefit Programs, in PROVIDING HEALTH
CARE BENEFITS IN RETIREMENT 72, 72-74 (Mazo et al. ed. 1994). See also EMP.
BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 69
(2005),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/fundamentals/Fnd05.Prt03.Chp26.
pdf (noting that “[a]s a result of FAS 106, and the increasing cost of providing
retiree health benefits in general, many employers began a major overhaul of
their retiree health benefit programs”); Kaplan, supra note 5, at 297-98 (“Faced
with [FASB No. 106] financial statement disclosures, many companies felt
considerable pressure to reduce the extent of their obligations, and many firms
initiated cost-reduction strategies to that end. The impact was calamitous for
retirees. Among employers with at least 200 employees, the share of such
employers who offer any type of retiree benefits dropped from 66% in 1988 to
35% in 2006.
Even larger employers - namely, those with at least
1000 employees - have diminished their offerings of retiree health benefits
steadily.”).
34. Professor Gruber has recently concluded that “[T]he rapid rise in
health care costs has been driven by quality-improving technological change.”
Jonathan Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the United States, 46 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 571, 603 (2008); see also Paul Krugman & Robin Wells, The Health
Care Crisis and What To Do About It, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Mar. 23, 2006),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/18802 (agreeing that “new medical
technology” is the principal factor driving health care costs higher); Jonathan
S. Skinner, The Costly Paradox of Health-Care Technology, MIT TECH. REV.
(Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/518876/the-costlyparadox-of-health-care-technology/ (discussing why it is that health care
technology contributes to rising health care costs); Snapshots: How Changes in
Medical Technology Affect Health Care Costs, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. (Mar. 2, 2007), http://kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/snapshots-howchanges-in-medical-technology-affect/ (“Health care experts point to the
development and diffusion of medical technology as primary factors in
explaining the persistent difference between health spending and overall
economic growth, with some arguing that new medical technology may account
for about one-half more of real long-term spending growth.”); Daniel Callahan,
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So, employers and their unions-already scrambling to
survive in the increasingly difficult manufacturing sector in the
United States-faced real cost increases and were required to
incorporate a new accounting approach that made those
increases appear even larger. Not surprisingly, many employers
began to limit and/or eliminate retiree health care benefits.35
These adjustments were easier in non-unionized sectors where
employers simply amended existing plans without any
organized objection from current or retired workers.36 In the
Health Care Costs and Medical Technology, HASTINGS CTR. 79-82 (2008),
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Publications/BriefingBook/Detail.aspx?id=2
178 (“New or increased use of medical technology contributes 40-50% to annual
cost increases, and controlling this technology is the most important factor in
reducing them”).
35. There has been a decline in employees with employment-based health
insurance. According to recent data from the Employee Benefit Research
Institute, only 64.2% of Americans aged eighteen to sixty-four years have some
form of employer-provided health insurance, a number that has declined from
69.3% as recently as 2000. Kaplan, supra note 5, at 294-95 (citing PAUL
FRONSTIN, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., SOURCES OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNINSURED: ANALYSIS OF THE MARCH 2007 CURRENT
POPULATION
SURVEY
7
(Oct.
2007),
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_10a-20071.pdf). Employers have
responded by placing caps on what they were previously willing to spend on
retiree health benefits. FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS,
supra note 33, at 69. “Others added age and service requirements; moved to
some type of ‘defined contribution’ health benefit; completely dropped retiree
health benefits for future retirees; or dropped benefits for current retirees . . .
. ” Id.
36. This did not prevent private, non-unionized workers from suing in an
effort to maintain these benefits. Abbruscato v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 274 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 2001); Devlin v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 274 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2001):
plaintiff-retirees left employment either through the
ordinary course of business or through early retirement
severance packages between 1989 and 1998. Both cases
involved the same fact pattern, except that the Devlin
retirees based their claims on pre-1987 SPDs, while the
Abbruscato retirees focused on benefit plan descriptions from
1987 and beyond. The key difference between the two cases
was that a newly written employee handbook (“Your
Handbook”) introduced in 1987 was the first version to
include a reservation-of-rights clause. . . .[T]here were three
categories of plaintiffs across these two cases: 1) pre-1987
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SPD regular retirees in Devlin whose plan lacked a
reservation-of-rights clause, 2) “Your Handbook” regular
retirees from 1987 forward who were subject to a reservationof-rights clause, and 3) early retirees whose plans also
contained a reservation-of-rights clause. As to the early
retirees, the Abbruscato court found that there were intrinsic
grounds in the plans to create ambiguity about the meaning
of “lifetime” benefits and overturned the lower court’s
summary judgment for Empire. The Second Circuit deemed
the eligibility formulas to conflict with the generalized
reservation-of-rights clause found elsewhere in the plans. . .
. By contrast, the same court found no such ambiguity that
would allow the “Your Handbook” regular retirees to pursue
their benefit claims against Empire. Instead, the Second
Circuit ruled that a generalized reservation-of-rights clause
plus termination language about a specific benefit provided a
clear message to retirees about the nonvesting nature of their
benefits. . . . Finally, the court upheld the motion of the pre1987 SPD plaintiffs in Devlin by ruling that there was
adequate written language in the SPDs “capable of
reasonably being interpreted as creating a promise’ to
survive an employer’s summary judgment motion.” Since the
pre-1987 SPDs lacked a reservation-of-rights clause, and
certain other sentences read that “retired employees, after
[meeting a condition precedent] will be insured” and that life
insurance benefits “will remain at [the annual salary] level
for the remainder of their lives,” there were reasonable
grounds to interpret an intent to vest life insurance benefits.
. . [Therefore,] the Empire retirees require[d] either 1) an
absence of an employer reservation-of-rights clause coupled
with a specific clause that was sufficiently ambiguous in
order to proceed. Thus, a generalized reservation-of-rights
clause, standing alone, is apparently sufficient to sustain an
employer's motion for summary judgment.
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 316-18. See also Stearns v. NCR Corp., 297 F.3d 706
(8th Cir. 2002):
[a] group of early retirees brought suit against their former
employer for reducing health benefits granted to them in
their severance package.
The plaintiffs accepted an
Enhanced Retirement Program package in 1993 that
provided, inter alia, a better health care package than was
currently offered under the company’s standard medical
plan. Six years later, the company instituted sweeping
changes, including higher premiums, increased deductibles
and co-payments, and cancellation of the company’s Medicare
supplement plan. Plaintiff Stearns represented the retiree
class, arguing that NCR’s purported reservation-of-rights
provision in the Plan Amendments subsection of the group
benefits plan was invalid. The Eighth Circuit ruled for the
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employer, citing its precedent from Hughes v. 3M Retiree
Medical Plan that an unambiguous reservation-of-rights
provision is sufficient to defeat a claim that retirement
welfare plan benefits are vested. Explaining the framework
of contract analysis, the court said that extrinsic evidence
could only be considered in cases of facial ambiguity or
conflict with other plans provisions.
Finding neither
situation, the Eighth Circuit held that NCR could terminate
benefits according to the reservation-of-rights clause.
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 318. In Bland v. Fiatallis North America, Inc., 401
F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2005), there was no reservation-of-rights clause:
The plaintiff-retirees protested their employer’s “onion
solution” to gradually peel away layers of retiree benefits
over time, and initiated suit on grounds that the contract
language was ambiguous and subject to extrinsic evidence of
an intent to vest. The Seventh Circuit recognized that
although health benefits do not vest automatically, they may
be so triggered by an affirmative contractual promise by the
employer. While the court noted that a contract that is silent
about vesting holds a presumption that the employer did not
intend to grant vested benefits, this presumption is defeated
by what Judge Richard Posner called “any positive indication
of ambiguity, [or] something to make you scratch your head.”
. . . Ultimately, in the absence of contrary evidence where the
language was ambiguous, the Seventh Circuit determined
that “lifetime” within the plan documents was used as a
durational term that equated to “good for life unless revoked
or modified.” Accordingly, it reversed the lower court’s
granting of summary judgment for the employer and
remanded the case to decide the scope of vested benefits that
were ostensibly promised by the employer.
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 319. And lastly, in Boubolis v. Transport Workers
Union of America, 442 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2006), an employee union was the
benefits-slashing employer. Plaintiff-retirees, former New York City Transit
Authority workers, alleged that they were given assurances at various
junctures during their employment with Local 100, of the Transport Workers
Union of America that they would have “lifetime health insurance coverage”
under Local 100’s plan. When new union leadership of Local 100 terminated
the health care benefits of all retirees who were otherwise eligible for health
insurance coverage from another employer, these retirees sued to enforce their
right to be covered by Local 100’s plan.
The retirees first argued that their health benefits were
"lifetime" in nature because, although the SPD lacked
explicit vesting language, it listed only two conditions ceasing employment and death - by which benefits could
terminate. Because they were already retired, plaintiffs
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unionized world of Tackett the parties appear to have decided to
rely on the cost containment device known as cap letters and to
wait silently and see if either the upward trajectory of health
care costs and/or the regulatory environment might improve.37
A cap letter refers to a written summary of caps the
employer and union agreed would govern maximum employer
contributions to retiree health costs. The caps in Tackett were
explicitly established to comply with FAS 106. At the 2011
bench trial, Ron Hoover who worked for the international union,
testified to the effect that:
[T]he 1991 cap letter as a union compromise to
help [the employer] control or minimize its
liabilities; he explained that the letter was a way
to avoid showing the extent of projected liability
for retiree medical benefits due to FASB
considerations. In other words, Hoover noted, the
cap letter was a mechanism by which a company
could minimize cost numbers to attract investors.
He explained how the letter worked and the
importance of what he called the “bite date”, or the
date on which retirees would have to actually
begin contributions toward their medical
insurance. Hoover emphasized the importance of
always moving the bite date out so that it could
always be subject to further movement by
negotiation.38
reasoned that they could lose their benefits only upon death;
i.e., the end of their lifetime. Unfortunately for the retirees,
the Second Circuit rejected this argument based on the
widely held rule that the absence of vesting language does
not create a promise to vest by the employer. The SPD
therefore did not, on its own, vest lifetime health care
benefits in the retirees.
Kaplan, supra note 5, at 320.
37. I am indebted to Joe Stuligross, Esq. of the United Steelworkers for
explaining to me the form and function of cap letters in connection with both
the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements and the management of
retiree health care cost containment.
38. Tackett v. M&G Polymers USA, LLC, 742 F. Supp. 2d 901, 904 (S.D.
Ohio 2010).
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In addition, Hoover noted that there was a general
understanding between the employer and the union that the
“bite date” would always be moved up as “the union never
intended to have retirees pay a premium and that he understood
that the company representatives could not say publically that
there would never be retiree contributions because the
accountants would then not certify the FASB statements.”39
Apparently the caps in place always distinguished between
maximums for retirees over the age of 65 (i.e. those who were
Medicare40 eligible) and those under 65 who had no other source
of health insurance.
In 1994, for example, the cap at Goodyear master agreement
facilities (which were not part of this litigation) was $11,700 for
those under 65 and $4,200 for those over 65.41 The Medicare
39. Exhibit A: Excerpt of Ron Hoover Deposition Transcript at 72, Tackett
v. M&G Polymers USA, LLC, 742 F. Supp. 2d 901 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (No. 2:07cv-00126-GLF-NMK).
40. Medicare is the largest health insurance program offered by the
United States government, serving more than 49 million people. It is run by
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which is part of the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. What is Medicare,
MYMEDICAREANSWERS.COM, https://www.mymedicareanswers.com/docs/DOC1016 (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). Medicare covers Americans 65 and older and
those who qualify due to a disability. While being “eligible” means you may
enroll in Medicare, there are strict rules regarding when you can enroll. Id.
At age 65, an individual is eligible for Parts A and B, even if they still work,
though, some individuals may have to pay premiums for Part A and most have
to pay premiums for Part B. Id. Medicare is divided into four parts: A, B, C,
and D. Id. Parts A and B are considered “Original Medicare.” Id. Part A, or
hospital insurance, helps cover an individual’s care when they are admitted to
a hospital or skilled nursing facility, which also includes hospice care and home
healthcare. The Part and Plans of Medicare, MYMEDICAREANSWERS.COM,
https://www.mymedicareanswers.com/docs/DOC-1014 (last visited Oct. 7,
2015). Part B, or medical insurance, helps cover doctor’s visits and outpatient
care. Id. Part B also assists in paying for some services that Part A does not
cover, such as physical therapy, some home healthcare, and some preventive
services. Id. Part C, or Medicare Advantage (MA), is not offered by the federal
government as Parts A and B are, but instead offered by health insurance
companies. Id. Part C covers everything Parts A and B cover and often covers
other services such as wellness programs. Id. Part D, or the Medicare
Prescription Drug Plan, is provided by insurance companies and other private
companies, and is an optional prescription drug coverage plan. Id.
41. Defendant’s Exhibit 3 at 2, Tackett I (claiming that beginning on July
20, 1994,
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program was clearly an important backdrop to the M & G
Polymers retiree healthcare benefit.42 For retirees too young for
Medicare the only likely source of health insurance was the
employer’s coverage; for those 65 and above the expectation was
that Medicare would function as the main source of coverage.
This accounts for the wide variation in cap amounts. The cap
letter arrangement also explains the essence of the mysterious
silence about a crucial aspect of the retiree health benefit-why
neither party had an incentive to formalize its views about
vesting and the source of external pressures that encouraged
[t]he average annual Company contributions to be paid for all
health care benefits per retired employee (including their
surviving spouse) who retires on or after May 1, 1994, shall
not exceed $11,700 for retirees (including surviving spouses)
under age 65 and $4,200 for retirees (including surviving
spouses) over age 65).
42. Medicare, as has been noted by others, is generally only available to
those age 65 and older. For retirees who lose employer sponsored health
insurance, the only remaining alternative is government-provided or
government-paid care, such as that available through Medicare and Medicaid
for certain parts of the population. But healthy, early retirees historically have
not qualified for either of the safety net programs. Except for those with
serious disabilities or certain terminal conditions, Medicare eligibility begins
at age sixty-five. Medicaid eligibility traditionally has required not only that
a person fit into specified categories—none of which has been likely for
someone age fifty-five plus who is not disabled—but also that the person be
impoverished. Cancelosi, supra note 12, at 765. Cancelosi also notes:
[o]n the other hand, retirees age sixty-five and older start out
reasonably well thanks to Medicare’s safety net. They still
need and use employment-based coverage, however, because
gaps in Medicare coverage make the safety net far less solid
than many realize. Thus, for example, annual out-of-pocket
health care spending by Medicare beneficiaries averaged
$4241 per beneficiary in 2006, with younger beneficiaries
spending far less on average than older ones. The vast
majority of Medicare beneficiaries—eighty-nine percent in
2007—therefore obtain some form of secondary insurance to
offset these costs. About a third have access to such
insurance through a former employer. This remained true
even after the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and
Modernization Act (MMA) added Part D prescription drug
coverage, closing what had been one of the most glaring
benefit holes.
Id. at 765-66.
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both the union and the employer to behave in a way that
presented the best possible picture of the company’s health to
outsiders.
C.

Yard-Man and Sixth Circuit Jurisprudence

The behavior of the parties in Tackett and their mutual
confidence in the cap letter device can only be fully understood
in light of the somewhat unique approach the Sixth Circuit had
taken decades earlier in an effort to deal with labor agreements
and ancillary contracts that were silent or ambiguous on some
critical issue. In its landmark decision in Yard-Man, the appeals
court, ostensibly relying on ordinary principles of contract law,
held that an employer whose collective bargaining agreement
did not specifically address the duration of retiree health
benefits must have intended those benefits to vest for life. The
Yard-Man decision emphasized the role of context and, as the
Supreme Court noted in Tackett, “[t]he Court of Appeals has
continued to extend the reasoning of Yard-Man. Relying on
Yard-Man’s statement that context considerations outweigh the
effect of a general termination clause, it has concluded that,
‘[a]bsent specific durational language referring to retiree
benefits themselves,’ a general durational clause says nothing
about the vesting of retiree benefits.”43
Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous court, expresses
unmistakable frustration with Yard-Man and its ostensibly
contextual approach to discerning the intent of the parties in the
face of silence about the duration of retiree health benefits. He
asserts: “[a]s an initial matter, Yard-Man violates ordinary
contract principles by placing a thumb on the scale in favor of
vested retiree benefits in all collective bargaining agreements.
43. M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 935 (2015) (“We
disagree with the Court of Appeals’ assessment that the inference applied in
Yard-Man and its progeny represent ordinary principles of contract law. As
an initial matter, Yard-Man violates ordinary contract principles by placing a
thumb on the scale in favor of vested retiree benefits in all collectivebargaining agreements. That rule has no basis in ordinary principles of
contract law. And it distorts the attempt ‘ascertain the intention of the
parties.’ Yard-Man’s assessment of likely behavior in collective bargaining is
too speculative and too far removed from the context of any particular contract
to be useful in discerning the parties’ intention”).
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That rule has no basis in ordinary principles of contract law.”44
Thomas suggests that Yard-Man consists of one inference after
another and results in a conclusion that is directly at odds with
traditional principles.
The Court of Appeals also failed even to consider
the traditional principle that courts should not
construe ambiguous writings to create lifetime
promises. . . . Similarly the Court of Appeals failed
to consider the traditional principle that
‘contractual obligations will cease, in the ordinary
course, upon termination of the bargaining
agreement.’ That principle does not preclude the
conclusion that the parties intended to vest
lifetime benefits for retirees. Indeed, we have
already recognized that ‘a collective bargaining
agreement [may] provid[e] in explicit terms that
certain benefits continue after the agreement’s
expiration.’ But when a contract is silent as to the
duration of retiree benefits, a court may not infer
that the parties intended those benefits to vest for
life.45
Although the trial record is replete with suggestions that
the ambiguity in Tackett was strategic or “conscious” as
Professor Duhl has suggested,46 Thomas does not distinguish
44. Id.
45. Id. at 936-37 (citation omitted).
46. See Gregory M. Duhl, Conscious Ambiguity: Slaying Cerberus in the
Interpretation of Contractual Inconsistencies, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 71 (2009). In
Duhl’s article he discusses this intentional ambiguity:
Scholars have previously given attention to the benefits
(especially economic) of lawyers intentionally drafting open,
incomplete, and vague contracts, but Cerberus illustrated
that lawyers also deliberately draft contracts that are
inconsistent. Although open, incomplete, and vague terms
should be encouraged in the drafting of contracts in certain
circumstances, we should discourage rather than encourage
ambiguity. Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott do not believe
that the goal in contract interpretation is to help courts get
at the “correct answer,” but rather to get parties to write in
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between ambiguity that arises from a simple failure of drafting
and the strategic approach that both M & G Polymers and the
union both found so useful for so many. The core question raised
by Tackett is what is the proper rule of interpretation when both
parties found it advantageous to leave a critical term out of a
contract?
The problem in Tackett is by no means unique to labor
contracts or employee benefits plans for active or retired
employees.
As Judge Posner had observed, even in a setting of perfect
foresight an interpretive problem may arise. Parties may
rationally decide not to provide for a contingency, preferring to
economize on negotiation costs by delegating completion of the
contract, should the contingency materialize, to the courts. This
is especially true if they think that the likelihood that the
contingency will materialize is slight. But even if they think the
likelihood is significant they may prefer to leave the contingency
not provided for. Deliberate ambiguity may be a necessary
condition of making the contract; the parties may be unable to
“the court’s language.” But Schwartz and Scott miss the
mark in not accounting for deliberate ambiguity in
addressing what is the majoritarian default rule that courts
should use to interpret contracts that are silent as to “judicial
interpretive style.” They suggest that the default should be
the Willistonian four-corners rule, which bars parties from
introducing extrinsic evidence to show that the contract is
ambiguous. The Willistonian approach enables parties to
include ambiguous language in contract when it suits their
interests, at the expense of courts having to make an
imprecise judgment about whether the contract is
ambiguous, which risks getting the result wrong.
. . . . [C]ourts should discourage lawyers from drafting
intentionally ambiguous contracts in the rush to get a deal
done. Part of lawyers’ professional obligation is to draft clear
contractual language for their clients. Furthermore, lawyers
have an ethical obligation to reveal known inconsistencies
that exist in the agreements that they are drafting, and not
to contribute to such inconsistencies. Where the language of
the agreement is ambiguous, there is a risk—especially from
application of the four-corners rule—of courts not enforcing
the obligations to which the parties consented. This risk
poses a challenge to consent and other autonomy-based
theories of contract.
Id. at 76-77 (citations omitted).

27

344

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:2

agree on certain points yet be content to take their chances on
being able to resolve them, with or without judicial intervention,
should the need arise. It is a form of compromise, like “agreeing
to disagree.”47 Professor Duhl argues that intentionally vague
contracts are inconsistent with a lawyer’s ethical duty to be
forthright and to respect the ethical obligation to draft contracts
clearly—even when the lawyer believes that without ambiguity
the deal may not get done.48 He urges courts to rely explicitly on
the “forthright negotiator” principle in order to discourage
drafters from doing precisely what the parties in Tackett both
felt obliged to do.49
It is hard to see how a forthright negotiator could have
solved the core problem in Yard-Man or in Tackett. The hard
reality of retiree health benefits is that they began as a relatively
inexpensive way to continue health benefits for a small group of
formerly active employees who needed a bridge to Medicare.50
47. Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation
3 (John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 229, 2004),
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/229-rap-contracts.pdf. Judge Posner
proceeds to say:
The goal of a system, methodology, or doctrine for contractual
interpretation is to minimize contractual transaction costs,
broadly understood as obstacles to efforts voluntarily to shift
resources to their most valuable use. Those costs can be very
great when by inducing parties not to contract they prevent
resources from being allocated efficiently. Because methods
of reducing contractual transaction costs, such as litigation,
are themselves costly, careful tradeoffs are required. But it
would be a serious mistake for courts to take the position that
any ambiguity in a contract must be the product of a culpable
mistake by one or both of the parties; that the judicial
function in contract law is to punish parties who do not make
their agreement clear. Sometimes it is, but more often it is
not.
Id. at 3-4 (citations omitted). Judge Posner concludes his paper with, “[t]he
more carefully drafted the contract is, the easier it will be for the parties to
resolve a dispute over its meaning when the dispute first arises, in other words
at the prelitigation stage.” Id. at 42. Thus, lowering the transactional costs
that could potentially be incurred.
48. Duhl, supra note 45, at 115.
49. See generally Duhl, supra note 45
50. Kaplan, supra note 5, at 293.
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Retirees who had spent twenty or thirty years working in heavy
manufacturing jobs often needed to leave the workforce well
before the age of 65. And, if they made it to 65, anything else
the employer offered functioned as a supplement to Medicare.51
If the forthright negotiator understands both the pressures

Retiree health benefits originated as an extension of
employer-provided health insurance for employees, a
phenomenon that itself began largely as an employer
response to wage controls imposed by Congress during World
War II and was later canonized by a tax law provision that
excluded such insurance from employees’ taxable income.
The pervasiveness of industrial unions during this period
further contributed to the expansion of various employerprovided job benefits, most especially health insurance. As
an outgrowth of this phenomenon, employers agreed to
maintain such health insurance after their workers retired,
an especially valuable benefit during the period prior to the
enactment of Medicare. Employers were generally amenable
to providing these benefits, because health care costs were
not expensive, life expectancy was rather limited, and no
actual expenditures were required until many years into the
future. As Americans began living longer in retirement,
however, these benefits became much more expensive at the
same time that they became more valuable to covered
retirees.
Id. at 293-94; see History of Health Insurance Benefits, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT
RESEARCH INST. http://www.ebri.org/publications/facts/index.cfm?fa=0302fact
(Mar. 2002) (detailing the history of employer-based health benefits in the
United States).
51. Richardson, supra note 2, at 8. “For those with employer sponsored
retiree health insurance, the cost of coverage varies significantly between the
pre-65 and the Medicare-eligible populations. The reason is that employer
sponsored retiree health insurance is the primary source of coverage for the
pre-65 group, whereas employer sponsored insurance is the supplemental
payer for the Medicare eligible population.” Id.
There are two basic designs for retiree health benefit plans:
one for plans covering retirees under age 65 and one covering
retirees age 65 and older. The reason for this age distinction
is that eligibility for the Medicare program begins at age 65.
For retirees under age 65, the benefit plan is usually based
on the coverage they received while working, although, in
recent years, programs for early retirees have increasingly
featured different premium sharing than programs for active
employees.
FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS, supra note 33, at 71.
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imposed on the employer by FAS 106 and has paid attention to
the rapidly escalating cost of health insurance, she will recognize
immediately the advantage of forestalling for as long as possible
the inevitable. Whether her client is the union or M & G
Polymers she will understand that the best possible outcome is
to push forward the date on which the employer can no longer
afford to cover the entire cost of retiree healthcare. If, relying
on the cap letter device, this result can be postponed for three
more years, which is an unambiguous win for both parties. The
union understands that FAS 106 makes it entirely unreasonable
to demand explicit language about vesting; the employer
likewise wants to present the most attractive financial picture
possible. The union and the employer both also know that,
increasingly, the cap amounts are failing to keep up with
healthcare inflation. The only end to this story is a bad one.
These parties aren’t lacking information or suffering from the
failure of a legal representative who is insufficiently aggressive
or honest. What they both lack is the ability to navigate the twin
demands of increased transparency and rapidly escalating
health care costs.
Under these circumstances the Sixth Circuit’s “thumb on
the scale” in Yard-Man, while inconsistent with basic contract
principles as Scalia pointed out in oral argument and Thomas
notes in Tackett, represents an understandable albeit flawed
approach to an otherwise impossible predicament for the
parties. It was entirely reasonable for retirees to assume that
their benefits were available to them for life at no cost. The
entire course of conduct between the parties supported this
understanding.52 At the same time, representatives of both the
52. From the beginning in 1991 the Company expressed this view:
For purposes of conforming with the new Financial
Accounting
Standards
Board
(FASB)
accounting
requirements and rising health care costs, the Company has
established a required maximum average annual company
cost per retiree for medical coverage.
These limits are presently $10,500 per year for each retired
employee (including surviving spouse) under age 65 and
$4,200 for each retired employee (including surviving spouse)
over age 65, with those ages being determined as of January
1 of each year. These limits equal the average cost for the
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over 65 and under 65 age groups. The limits should not be
confused with the claim payments for an individual retiree.
If the average for either group in the future exceeds the
present averages, then the cost of that excess will be allocated
among all members of the group evenly. No retired employee
or surviving spouse shall be obligated to contribute for their
health care costs that exceed the above maximum average
cost limits.
Exhibit 1 at 6, Tackett I. This was true even during times of negotiation where
it would have seemed likely that the company would begin requiring retirees
to pay. This is shown in a letter dated November 23, 2003:
During 2003 negotiations between M&G Polymers U.S.A.
LLC (the “Company”) and the United Steelworkers and its
Local 644L (collectively the “Union”), the Company and the
Union discussed the costs and burdens associated with
various benefits, including medical benefits for active
employees and retirees. The parties recognize there are
many challenges associated with maintenance of these
benefits, which include unique issues resulting from the large
number of retirees in comparison to the employees actively
working for the Company. At the same time, the Union
emphasized the importance of these benefits for active
employees, future retirees, and preexisting retirees. The
parties during negotiations agreed to certain modifications of
the health care benefits available to active employees and
retirees, including modifications in plan design and
provisions regarding premium cost sharing for these benefits.
The Company and the Union have mutually agreed, during
the 2003 negotiations, to make the same health care benefits
as will be provided to active employees available to retirees.
Except as set forth below, these benefits will be provided to
active employees available to retirees. Except as set forth
below, these benefits will be made available to retirees on the
same terms and conditions as for active employees, except
that premium cost sharing charged to retirees will be based
on the amount by which total cost for all retiree insurances
(medical, life, etc.) exceed the caps set forth in Letter H dated
January 1, 2001. In addition, retirees will not be required to
make contribution toward the cost of health care benefit
premiums until January 1, 2006.
Exhibit 8: Letter of Understanding 2003-6—Retiree Health Care Benefits at 6,
Tackett I. In addition, letters from May 15, 1991, July 20, 1994, May 9, 1997,
January 1, 2001, all claim that there will be a cap on health care coverage, but
all letters claim that “no retired employee or surviving spouse shall be
obligated to contribute for such excess health care cost.” See Defendants’
Exhibit 2 at 8, Tackett I; Defendants’ Exhibit 3 at 2, Tackett I; Defendants’
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employer and the employees must have understood the risk
associated with their strategy of silence and postponement. One
day, unless the cost of healthcare dropped dramatically, the
employer would no longer be able to afford to offer retirees cost
free health insurance. The outcome in Tackett is not surprising,
nor is the high court’s repudiation of Yard-Man which never
enjoyed much support outside the Sixth Circuit. The only
remarkable feature of Tackett is that the parties, relying on
strategic silence made an essentially unworkable arrangement
last as long as they did.
III. Alternative Approaches and the Limited Applicability of
Yard-Man
Much of Justice Thomas’ opinion in Tackett is devoted to
critiquing the Sixth Circuit’s longstanding precedent for dealing
with labor contracts that reference benefits provisions but fail to
speak explicitly to the vesting question. Thomas may have felt
empowered to reject Yard-Man in part because so many other
circuit courts did so first. The fact is Yard-Man never gained
much traction outside of the Sixth Circuit, much to the dismay
of some.53 It is a measure of how widespread the retreat from
retiree health care has been over the past few decades that every
single circuit court of appeals has had several occasions upon
which to evaluate the Yard Man approach. And, in most
instances outside of the Sixth Circuit, these courts have declined
Exhibit 4 at 2, Tackett I; Exhibit H at 28, Tackett I.
53. David L.Gregory, COBRA: Congress Provides Partial Protection
against Employer Termination of Retiree Health Insurance, 24 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 77, 90 (1987) (“Yard-Man is an obviously significant case, seriously
dealing with the difficult conceptual analysis of whether benefits are vested
and interminable, supplemented by the “status” benefit analysis. This case
encapsulates the pivotal conceptual inquiry that the courts must conduct in all
such cases, and helpfully suggests appropriate general guidelines to structure
this analysis”); Joan Vogel, Until Death Do Us Part: Vesting of Retiree
Insurance, 9 INDUS. REL. L.J. 183, 207 (1987) (“Yard-Man . . . stand[s] for the
proposition that when the language of the agreement is ambiguous and when
the company’s statements and actions indicate that it did not consider the
benefits to be limited to the duration of the collective bargaining agreement,
then courts will treat the benefits as lifetime benefits. This is a reasonable
result; in the absence of clear language indicating that benefits last only for
the duration of the collective bargaining agreement, retirees are likely to
believe they have lifetime benefits and will plan accordingly.”).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/1

32

2016

AFTER TACKETT

349

to presume that the parties intended for retiree health benefits
to vest absent clear language to the contrary.
For example, in Anderson v. Alpha Portland Industries54 the
Eighth Circuit explicitly rejected the retirees’ attempt to invoke
a Yard-Man inference. “[W]e disagree with Yard-Man to the
extent that it recognizes an inference of intent to vest. Congress
explicitly exempted welfare benefits from ERISA’s vesting
requirements. . . . Proper allocation of the burden of proof in this
case leads to the conclusion that the district court correctly held
that retiree welfare benefits were intended to last only for the
duration of the CBA [collective bargaining agreement].”55 In the
Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner authored the majority opinion in
the well-known case of Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp.56 While
54. Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., 836 F.2d 1512 (8th Cir. 1988)
(ruling that welfare plans did not vest as a matter of law and that the former
employees had the burden of proving that the parties intended that the
duration of benefits was not tied to the agreement that created them. The
former employees relied on a faulty summary plan description given to them
by the former employer. The court held that the former employees did not
show significant reliance on the summary sufficient to secure relief.).
55. Id. at 1517. (Explaining briefly, but accurately, that, in general,
ERISA provides fewer protections for welfare plan benefits such as healthcare
then for pensions). See, e.g., Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka
& Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 513-14 (1997) (explaining that Congress
purposely chose the word “plan” as opposed to “pension plan” as it could have
easily done to exempt welfare benefits to vest automatically); Curtiss-Wright
Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) (claiming that “ERISA does not
create any substantive entitlement to employer-provided health benefits or
any other kind of welfare benefits. Employers or other plan sponsors are
generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify or
terminate welfare plans”); Diehl v. Twin Disc, Inc., 102 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir.
1996) (“[T]he insurance benefits at issue here are ‘welfare’ benefits, which,
unlike pension benefits under ERISA, do not automatically vest in the absence
of an agreement providing for lifetime entitlement.”) (citations omitted);
Bidlack v. Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 604-05 (7th Cir. 1993) (“ERISA
does not require the vesting of health or other ‘welfare’ benefits, as it does
pension benefits”) (citations omitted).
56. Bidlack, 993 F.2d at 604-05. . . . The lead opinion specifically adopts:
[t]he weak no-vest rule. First, it rejects the strong no-vest
rule (the Senn rule) because its rigidity may frustrate the
actual intent of the parties, and it is in tension with the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The lead opinion
likewise rejects [the parol substitution rule] because that rule
would resort to extrinsic evidence even when the agreement
is silent about retiree benefits, thus ‘depriving parties of the
protection of a written contract.’ Having rejected both of
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declining to follow the Sixth Circuit’s inference in Yard-Man the
court noted that a contract can “create[] entitlements that
outlast it.”57 Specifically,
these ‘extreme’ options, the lead opinion falls back on the one
remaining option, the weak no-vest rule, and finds that it
comports with settled principles of contract law.
Id. at 611 (citation omitted).
57. Id. at 606. The court goes on to state:
At argument the plaintiffs’ counsel gave the example of
wages due under a contract of employment at will, a contract
terminable at the whim of either party. Suppose the
employer’s practice is to pay employees at the end of each
week for the work they have done during the week. Jones,
an employee at will, is fired at noon on Wednesday, having
worked 20 hours that week. The contract is at an end as of
noon that day, and yet, quite apart from any statutory
entitlement that employees may have to be paid at the agreed
rate for work actually done (Nat’l. Metalcrafters v. McNeil,
784 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1986)), the employee would have a
compelling argument that the employer’s promise to pay for
work actually done had survived the expiration of the
contract. This is not the best example for the plaintiffs’ point,
however, because an alternative conceptualization of
employment at will treats it as a unilateral contract that is
accepted by the employee’s working at the agreed wage. 1A
Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 152 at 13-14
(1963). So understood, a contract of employment at will does
not end until the employee is paid. But there are plenty of
better examples—examples of bilateral contracts that create
obligations that outlive the term of the contract because the
parties wanted them to do so. A contract that contains a postemployment restrictive covenant is one, Tower Oil & Tech.
Co. v. Buckley, 425 N.E.2d 1060 (1981); J.D. Marshall Int’l,
Inc. v. Fradkin, 409 N.E.2d 4, 42 (1980), and there are others.
Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 207 (1991);
Ryan v. Chromalloy American Corp., 877 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.
1988); In re White Farm Equipment Co., 788 F.2d 1186, 1193
(6th Cir. 1986). No doubt a court should cast a cold eye on
contentions that a contract with a fixed term actually created
a perpetual obligation, William B. Tanner Co. v. SpartaTomah Broadcasting Co., 716 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1983),
and should, therefore, as Senn and many other cases hold
(notably Litton), presume that a collective bargaining
agreement ceases to obligate the employer when the
agreement’s term (invariably three years) is up. But it is not
an irrebuttable presumption. “Rights which accrued or
vested under the [collective bargaining] agreement will, as a
general rule, survive termination of the agreement.” Litton
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[E]mployers
adamant
against
assuming
perpetual obligations can eliminate all doubt by
insisting on a clause that makes any entitlement
to health benefits granted by the agreement
expire on the date the agreement expires.
Employers don’t even have to bargain over health
benefits of retired employees. They certainly don’t
have to grant such benefits in perpetuo. If they
did so in the past, not anticipating the recent rise
in health care costs, they should not expect the
courts to bail them out by undoing the
contractually determined allocation of risk on the
question.58
In the First Circuit, a reservation of rights (ROR) clause was
sufficient to defeat employee claims that a collection of welfare
plan benefits had vested.59 Although the plaintiffs raised YardFin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S at 207. The question is
what it takes to rebut the presumption. We add that the
obligation for which the plaintiffs contend in this suit is not
perpetual, because retired people and their widows (or
widowers) do not live forever.
Id. at 606-07.
58. Id. at 609 (citation omitted).
Employers don’t even have to bargain over health benefits of
retired employees. They certainly don’t have to grant such
benefits in perpetuo. If they did so in the past, not
anticipating the recent rise in health costs, they should not
expect the courts to bail them out by undoing the
contractually determined allocation of risk on the question.
Courts do not sit to relieve contract parties of their
improvident commitments, except within the limited
dispensation conferred by the doctrine of impossibility, not
here invoked. Contracting parties who want to be spared the
uncertainties of trial by jury have only themselves to blame
if by failing to specify the limits of their undertakings they
open the door to extrinsic evidence of contractual meaning.
Id. (citations omitted).
59. Senior v. NSTAR Elec. & Gas Co., 449 F.3d 206 (1st Cir. 2006). The
court claims
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Man and encouraged the First Circuit to adopt it, Judge Lynch
noted, “[o]ur view is that in a claim for benefits based on a labor
agreement under the LMRA federal labor law creates no
presumption regarding vesting.”60 Likewise, the Second Circuit
declined to adopt the Yard-Man inference. In Schonholz v. Long
Island Jewish Medical Center,61 the court noted that a party
[i]f
the intent of the bargain contained in the ERP
agreements was to remove the reservation of rights the
company had always retained and to advantage plaintiffs
over all other employees, one would expect the agreement, or
some other relevant document, to say so. As we discuss, the
bargaining history shows nothing of the sort.
Id. at 222. The court concludes that, after applying normal principles of
contract interpretation and labor agreements, the health benefit summaries
referenced the dental plan documents, which contained the reservation of
rights language, and say these plan documents are governing. Id.
60. Id. at 218. Judge Lynch goes on to list many reasons the court refuses
to adopt any presumptions in favor of vesting:
We fear that the use of presumptions may interfere with the
correct interpretation, under normal LMRA rules, of the
understanding reach by the parties. Secondly, the use of
presumptions may also be inconsistent with the dynamics of
bargaining set up under the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169, and the LMRA. Third, Congress could
easily have created interpretive presumptions by statute had
it cared to do so. The text of the LMRA does not contain any
statutory presumptions.
Fourth, though the courts
sometimes create judicial interpretive presumptions, there is
no reason to craft judicial default rules here. See Bidlack v.
Wheelabrator Corp., 993 F.2d 603, 604 (7th Cir. 1993) (en
banc). The Supreme Court has crafted only one presumption
under the LMRA: the presumption in favor of arbitrability in
labor contracts, which applies when a CBA contains an
arbitration clause. See Local 285, Serv. Employees Int’l
Union v. Nonotuck Res. Assocs. Inc., 64 F.3d 735, 738 (1st
Cir. 1995). . . . Fifth, in the end, the question will usually be
one of the degree of clarity that benefits were or were not
unalterably vested, and if vested, under what conditions.
There are traditional rules of interpretation of labor
agreements which have proven adequate to answer those
questions as to non-ERISA benefits, and we do not see why
those rules would not work when ERISA benefits are at
stake. Those are the rules we use.
Id.
61. Schonholz v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 87 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1996).
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must “point to a written language capable of reasonably being
interpreted as creating a promise” in order for vesting to occur.62
The Fifth Circuit63 likewise shied away from Yard-Man.
Alone among the courts of appeals, the Eleventh Circuit and
the Fourth Circuit explicitly followed Yard-Man albeit while
noting that it simply instructs courts to apply ordinary rules of
contract interpretation. United Steelworkers v. Connors Steel
Co.,64 and Keffer v. Porter65 (but see Dewhurst v. Century

The court points to clarification provided by the Supreme Court:
“ERISA . . . follows standard trust law principles in dictating
only that whatever level of specificity a company ultimately
chooses, in an amendment procedure or elsewhere, it is
bound to that level.” Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen,
514 U.S. 73, 84 (1995). Therefore, any agreement to vest
Schonholz’s benefits would only have to be memorialized at
the same level of formality that LIJ chose in promulgating
the Severance Plan in the first place. In this case, the alleged
promise was memorialized not in a formal plan document,
but in the 1991 memorandum that Match sent to senior
employees. We easily conclude that the December 18 and
December 22 letters are at least as formal as the 1991
memorandum and that, therefore, the district court erred in
concluding that Schonholz’s claim is barred because “Match’s
letter is not a formal plan document.” Schonholz II, 889 F.
Supp. at 614. We also disagree with the district court’s
holding that LIJ’s commitment to vest Schonholz “must be in
‘precise language denying the right to withdraw benefits.’” Id.
at 615 (quoting Wise, 986 F.2d at 938). We do not think, at
least in this case, that Schonholz is required to point to
unambiguous language to support her claim. See Bidlack,
993 F.2d at 608-09. It is enough if she can point to written
language capable of reasonably being interpreted as creating
a promise on the part of LIJ to vest her severance benefits.
Because the December 18 letter may be so interpreted by a
trier of fact, we remand the contractual vesting claim to the
district court.
Id. at 78.
62. Id.
63. See Nichols v. Alcatel USA Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 378 (5th Cir. 2008)
(noting the Yard-Man inferences were never accepted by this court).
64. USW v. Connors Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1988).
65. Keffer v. H.K. Porter Co., 872 F.2d 60, 62 (4th Cir. 1989) (noting that
“The intended meaning of even the most explicit language can, of course, only
be understood in light of the context which gave rise to its inclusion.”) (citing
UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1467, 1479 (6th Cir. 1983)).
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Aluminum Co.)66 stand almost alone outside of the Sixth Circuit
in support of the Yard-Man inference. These cases stand in
sharp contrast with the lengthy list of cases in the Sixth Circuit,
which followed Yard-Man.67
The Supreme Court’s rejection of Yard-Man in Tackett
certainly cannot be said to have unsettled the law to a significant
degree outside of the Sixth Circuit. Even in that circuit the
Court of Appeals had recognized in Sprague v. General Motors68
that the presence of a ROR clause, which unambiguously
guaranteed to the employer the right to amend the plan,
defeated any subsequent claims that healthcare benefits had
vested.69 The near universal failure of the Yard-Man approach
to attract adherents outside the Sixth Circuit no doubt made it
an easy target for the Supreme Court.
IV. Contract Interpretation in Cases in Cases of Mutually

66. Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum Co., 649 F.3d 287 (4th Cir. 2011).
67. See, e.g., Cole v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 549 F.3d 1064, 1069 (6th Cir.
2008) (noting that Yard-Man creates no presumption that benefits are vested
for life.); Noe v. Polyone Corp., 520 F.3d 548, 568 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[u]nless a
company can point to explicit language in the relevant agreement stating that
“retirement benefits” terminate at a particular date or do not vest, the benefits
seem to vest as a matter of law. What we continually disclaim presuming we
continually seem to presume.”); UAW v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768
(6th Cir. 1999) (affirming the ongoing validity of Yard-Man); Golden v. KelseyHayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 656 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Yard-Man is still good law, and
controls this case.”).
68. Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998).
“Plaintiffs, retired employees of the defendant, General Motors Corporation,
allege that GM violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (“ERISA”), by denying them fully “paid-up” lifetime
health care benefits.” Id. at 392. The main thrust of the plaintiff’s complaint
was that GM had bound itself to provide salaried retirees and their spouses
basic health coverage for life, entirely at GM’s expense. “The right to such
coverage vested upon retirement, according to the plaintiffs, so the coverage
could never be changed or revoked.” Id. at 395. This complaint arose when
GM announced in late 1987 that significant changes would be effective in
health care coverage for both salaried employees and retirees the following
year. Id. Ultimately, the court affirmed the order that the employer was
entitled to summary judgment on the employees’ claims of breach of plan
documents because the plan reserved the right to amend the health care
benefits. The court itself claims, “[n]either the GM plan itself nor any of the
various summaries of the plan states or even implies that the plaintiffs’
benefits were vested.” Id. at 402.
69. See id.
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Strategic Silence
Given the shaky foundation of Yard-Man upon which the
Sixth Circuit rested its conclusion in Tackett that union
members could establish their claim to lifetime, employer paid
retiree health benefits, the Supreme Court’s forceful conclusion
that the Yard-Man approach was inconsistent with “ordinary
principles of contract law”70 is not especially surprising.
Thomas’ opinion for the entire Court, however, seems to leave no
room for the possibility that, on remand, the Sixth Circuit could
possibly conclude that the parties in fact agreed to free health
care for life.71 Four justices joined in a concurrence, though, that
suggests this conclusion is possible.
The concurrence makes four simple points about contract
interpretation in situations like those in Tackett: first, “the
intention of the parties, to be gathered from the whole
instrument, must prevail.”72 This is not especially helpful in
Tackett given the lack of language dealing directly with vesting
in the written instruments. (This, of course, is the predictably
risky position the union finds itself in following years of
“strategic silence”). Second, a court “must examine the entire
agreement in light of relevant industry-specific ‘customs,
practices, usages and terminology.’”73 Third, if the parties’
70. M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926, 930-933 (2015).
71. Justice Thomas enters into several reasons why the logic
underpinning the Yard-Man decision was flawed, and therefore led the Court
of Appeals to “further compound this error” of relying on Yard-Man when
deciding Tackett. Id. at 936. First, Thomas criticizes the Court of Appeals for
attempting to ascertain the intent of the parties during collective bargaining
with likely behavior as “too speculative and too far removed from the context
of any particular contract to be useful in discerning the parties’ intention.” Id.
at 935. Second, Thomas questions the ability of the Court of Appeals to
accurately understand the customs and intentions of parties across diverse
industries, which would be necessary in the collective bargaining process. Id.
Third, Thomas states that Yard-Man was not based in “any record evidence,”
and therefore the inferences it created rest on a “shaky factual foundation.” Id.
at 936. Fourth, Yard-Man principles allowed retiree benefits to vest at a point
in the future violates the basic contractual principle that a contract is designed
to “encompass the whole agreement of the parties.” Id. Finally, Thomas
criticizes the Appeals Court for misapplying other contractual principles
because it was “tugged” at by the influences of Yard-Man. Id.
72. Id. at 937 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing 11 Richard A. Lord,
Williston on Contracts § 30:2 (4th ed. 2012)).
73. Id. at 938 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing 11 Richard A. Lord,
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intent is clearly expressed in the contract then that expression
must control; where, as in Tackett, the contract is ambiguous, “a
court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine the intention
of the parties.”74 (This, as we shall see, may be the Tackett
plaintiffs’ only hope going forward). And, fourth, “implied
terms” from the expired labor agreements may serve as a basis
for concluding that the parties in fact intended retiree health
benefits to vest.75 (This fourth point is a clear rejection of the
employer’s claim that there can be no vesting without “clear and
express” language demonstrating intent to vest).76
The
concurrence concludes by noting that this entire inquiry must
take place without Yard-Man’s “thumb on the scale” but may
“for example, [focus on] the parties’ bargaining history.”77 This
is, for the Tackett plaintiffs, the only part of the opinion which
offers any hope going forward.78 The agreement itself, as noted,
Williston on Contracts § 30:4 (4th ed. 2012)).
74. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing 11 Richard A. Lord, Williston on
Contracts § 30:6 (4th ed. 2012)).
75. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“‘constraints upon the employer after
the expiration date of a collective-bargaining agreement,’ we have observed,
may be derived from the agreement's ‘explicit terms,’ but they ‘may arise as
well from . . . implied terms of the expired agreement.’”) (citing Litton Bus.
Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 203, 207 (1991)).
76. Id. at 937. “To effectuate the intent of the parties to a collective
bargaining agreement, and provide the uniformity needed in national labor
law, any commitment to vest health-care benefits should be clear and express
in the language of the agreement.” Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1, M&G
Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015) (No. 13-1010). Later in
their brief, the employer continues to argue that the “clear statement rule”
used by the Third and Fifth Circuits is the optimal solution to resolving silence
in collective bargaining agreements “regarding the duration of retiree healthcare benefits.” Id. at 10. Justice Ginsburg flatly refutes these arguments by
stating, “Contrary to M&G’s assertion, no rule requires “clear and express”
language in order to show that parties intended health-care benefits to vest.”
Tackett, 135 S. Ct. at 938 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
77. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. at 938 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
“If, after
considering all relevant contractual language in light of industry practices, the
Court of Appeals concludes that the contract is ambiguous, it may turn to
extrinsic evidence-for example, the parties’ bargaining history. The Court of
Appeals, however, must conduct the foregoing inspection without Yard-Man’s
‘thumb on the scale in favor of vested retiree benefits.’” Id.
78. A recent case, Fulghum v. Embarq Corp., has shed light on this
difference of perspective between the majority and concurring opinion in
Tackett. The District Court of Kansas rejected the employees’ claim that they
were promised lifetime benefits by their employer because they failed to
identify specific vesting language in their summary plan description (“SPD”).
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is consciously unclear; it is only the long relationship between
the parties, their shared concern about increasing demands for
transparency from regulators, and the cap agreements which
may suggest that union members’ reliance on what was not said
was both reasonable and worthy of legal recognition.
A.

ERISA’s Equitable Estoppel Jurisprudence

Tackett is certainly not the first instance in which the
administration of an ERISA plan79 has given rise to claims from
employees that written or oral communications, combined with
a long relationship and course of conduct between the parties,
The District Court required express vesting language, stating “. . . the fact that
these SPDs do not contain an express reservation of rights clause stating that
the plans cannot be amended or terminated does not indicate unalterable
lifetime benefits for plan participants.” Fulghum v. Embarq Corp., 938 F.
Supp. 2d 1090, 1110-11 (D. Kan. 2013). The Tenth Circuit affirmed this
decision in February 2015, one month after the Tackett decision. Fulghum v.
Embarq Corp., 778 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2015). However, the employees’
petition for certiorari relies on the principles of contract interpretation,
claiming that the Tenth Circuit’s reliance on the “clear and express language
rule represents the same error the Sixth Circuit made in Yard-Man, just in the
other direction.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 26, Fulgham v. Embarq
Corp., 778 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2015). The petitioners argue that the Tenth
Circuit’s rule is inferring that “no employer could possibly intend to vest health
care benefits through ambiguous language” even if the relationship of the
parties, industry custom, or extraneous circumstances were present (emphasis
in original). Id. at 27. This stands in contrast to Justice Ginsberg’s
concurrence, which clearly states “no rule requires ‘clear and express language’
in order to show that parties intended health-care benefits to vest.” Tackett,
135 S. Ct. at 938 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
79. ERISA is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (West 2015). Within its
provisions, it also specifies the requirements of coverage for employers when
they provide retiree benefits. Id. § 1321 (West 2015). Congress determined
that retirement benefits were an important factor “affecting the stability of
employment and the successful development of industrial relations,” and that
the protection of interstate commerce requires workers to have “minimum
standards” to “assur[e] the equitable character” of employer plans nationwide.
Id. § 1001 (West 2015). Congress declared this plan necessary to efficiently
allow the flow of workers throughout interstate commerce. Id. ERISA has also
been interpreted to provide the sole mechanism for asserting improper
processing of benefits paid to retirees required by ERISA. Singh v. Prudential
Health Care Plan, Inc., 335 F.3d 278, 289-90 (4th Cir. 2003). ERISA has
quickly become a nationwide standard for providing civil enforcement for a
retiree if they have been denied their benefits. Thus, the civil enforcement
provisions of ERISA are essential to both establishing and asserting the rights
of retirees to their benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (West 2015).
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created vested rights that are not clearly expressed in the
written contract.80 Indeed, there is a substantial ERISA
jurisprudence that attempts to apply common law principles of
equitable estoppel to cases involving disputes about plan
administration and interpretation.81
80. In addition to the numerous cases cited within this paper, several
other cases have involved both oral and written promises where a
misunderstanding between the parties or a change in the actual benefits
provided occurred. Oral Promise(s) that led to litigation: Ladoucer v. Credit
Lyonnais, 584 F.3d 510 (2d Cir. 2009); Perreca v. Gluck, 295 F.3d 215 (2d Cir.
2002); Smith v. Dunham-Bush, Inc., 959 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1992); Cefalu v. B.F.
Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290 (5th Cir. 1989); Straub v. Western Union Tele.
Co., 851 F.2d 1262 (10th Cir. 1988); Bingham v. CNA Financial Corp., 408 F.
Supp. 2d 563 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Sandler v. Marconi Circuit Tech. Corp., 814 F.
Supp. 263 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Moeller v. Bertrang, 801 F. Supp. 291 (D.S.D.
1992); Integrated Health Servs. at Brentwood, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison,
No. 98 C 0558, 1999 WL 1256255 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 1999). Written
Promise(s) that led to litigation: Vallone v. CNA Fin. Corp., 375 F.3d 623 (7th
Cir. 2004); Abbruscato v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 90 (2d
Cir. 2001); Devlin v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 76 (2d Cir.
2001); Frahm v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 137 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1998);
Am. Fed. Grain Millers v. Int’l Multifoods Corp., 116 F.3d 976 (2d Cir. 1997);
Elmore v. Cone Mills Corp., 23 F.3d 855 (4th Cir. 1994); Miller v. Taylor
Insulation Co., 39 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 1994); Adams v. Tetley USA, Inc., 363 F.
Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 2005); Nester v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 162 F.
Supp. 2d 901 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
81. First Circuit: Zipperer v. Raytheon Co., Inc., 493 F.3d 50 (1st Cir.
2007) (employee received an estimate that was much higher that the
retirement benefits he actually received. Since the information provided to the
employer was inaccurate, the claim was preempted by ERISA to prevent
alternate enforcement mechanisms under Massachusetts state law); Todisco v.
Verizon Comm., Inc., 497 F.3d 95 (1st Cir. 2007) (plaintiff employee filed a
complaint against employer for representations made over a telephone hotline
for employees who had questions about the employee benefit program.
Plaintiff’s husband was told that he could increase his level of coverage without
filing out additional statements about his current health, but the clear
language of the employer’s policy did not allow for this alteration; thus,
equitable estoppel claim denied); Mauser v. Raytheon Co. Pension Plan, 239
F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2001) (employee quit working for Raytheon and then rehired,
but argued he turned down a more lucrative job with a rival company because
he believed that his previous years of service would be accounted for under the
new more inclusive benefits program instituted by Raytheon. Equitable
estoppel denied because Raytheon had clear language indicating that this was
not the case). Second Circuit: Perreca v. Gluck, 295 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2002)
(employee claimed he relied on an oral promise by the Employer, but such oral
promises are unenforceable under ERISA); Aramony v. United Way
Replacement Benefit, 191 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 1999) (employee was involved in
felonious misconduct which violated a clause in the employee benefits
agreement, so United Way refused to pay his retirement benefits. Court held
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that the employee failed to establish extraordinary circumstances regarding
promises made about these benefits); Schonholz v. Long Island Jewish Med.
Ctr., 87 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1996) (establishing that an ERISA promissory estoppel
claim must rest upon the basic principles of contract law and requires the
plaintiff to establish 1) a promise, 2) reliance on the promise, 3) injury caused
in reliance, and 4) injustice if the promise is not enforced). Third Circuit:
Pell v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 539 F.3d 292 (3d Cir. 2008) (employee
was able to establish equitable estoppel because both his DuPont manager and
supervisor encouraged him to transfer from Conoco to DuPont for lower salary
for assurances that his years at Conoco would be factored into his pension
calculation); Kurz v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 1996)
(employee’s estoppel claim failed because they were unable to establish that
extraordinary circumstances existed, such as the company designing a pension
plan to deliberately profit from these misrepresentations); Curcio v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that plaintiff
was entitled to equitable estoppel because John Hancock misrepresented that
they would cover the expensive treatments of her deceased husband, but then
disclaimed them after discovering they were related to a hospital error).
Fourth Circuit: McCravy v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 690 F.3d 176 (4th Cir. 2012)
(equitable estoppel was a valid claim when the insurer continued accepting
checks for the employee’s daughter despite her aging out of the plan and also
never indicating to the contrary until the participant’s murder and benefits
were due); Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1992)
(finding that the written language of a policy preempted an estoppel claim
despite the insurer’s initial claim that all medical care charges would be
covered). Fifth Circuit: Mello v. Sara Lee Corp., 431 F.3d 440 (5th Cir. 2005)
(employee claimed that multiple sources within human resources assured him
that he would be entitled to a higher amount of benefits provided that he
appealed further up the corporation. However, the court held that the reliance
on such a statement could not be reasonable); Rodrigue v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co.,
948 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1991) (court reiterates that equitable estoppel is only
relevant to written promises, not oral promises as indicated by the plaintiffs).
Sixth Circuit: Bloemaker v. Laborers’ Local 265 Pension Fund, 605 F.3d 436
(6th Cir. 2010) (citing Armistead v. Vernitron Corp., 944 F.2d 1287, 1298 (6th
Cir. 1991)) (explaining that allowing third party representations cannot be
considered more powerful than written instruments without extraordinary
circumstances because it would prejudice retirement income of employees);
Trs. of Michigan Laborers’ Health Care Fund v. Gibbons, 209 F.3d 587 (6th
Cir. 2000) (providing an excellent analysis of the five equitable estoppel factors
necessary for a plaintiff to succeed on a claim of equitable estoppel); Sprague
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that GM’s
representations could not have been applied with the necessary “factual
precision” to qualify for relief on equitable estoppel). Seventh Circuit:
Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 226 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing
that a Wal-Mart employee who had been rehired did not receive an adequate
explanation of how COBRA benefits would bridge the gap for her coverage, and
thus, estoppel was an appropriate claim); Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 112
F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 1997) (Blue Cross represented that its employee should not
sue during the appropriate time period, and then used the lack of plaintiff’s
action as a defense); Black v. TIC Inv. Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 115 (7th Cir. 1990)
(finding that “where there is no danger that others associated with the Plan
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One possible avenue of redress for retirees hoping to hold
onto their health benefits is an estoppel claim based upon the
federal common law that has developed in connection with
ERISA welfare and pension plans.82 As others have noted,
can be hurt, there is no good reason to breach the general rule that
misrepresentations can give rise to estoppel.”). Eight Circuit: Jensen v.
SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 1994) (describing that SIPCO modifying its
retiree benefit plan, providing notice, and then not responding to inquiries
from employees was not grounds for an estoppel claim under ERISA); Slice v.
Sons of Norway, 34 F.3d 630, 633 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that “extracontractual promise[s]” were not covered under ERISA equitable estoppel
claims). Ninth Circuit: Spink v. Lockheed Corp., 125 F.3d 1257 (9th Cir.
1997) (Spink had cited facts that satisfied material misrepresentation because
Lockheed represented that his pension would transfer from his prior employer
if he chose to accept employment with Lockheed, but then did not honor those
promises); Pisciotta v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 91 F.3d 1326 (9th Cir. 1996)
(finding that the distinction between pre-ERISA and post-ERISA promises was
irrelevant to this class due to a mixed composition of these promises between
the workers); Greany v. W. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 973 F.2d 812, 821 (9th
Cir. 1992) (establishing that the 9th Circuit also requires two prerequisites to
the normal requirements for an ERISA equitable estoppel claim: 1) “the
provisions of the plan at issue must be ambiguous such that reasonable persons
could disagree about their meaning or effect,” and 2) “representations [must
be] made to the employee involving an oral interpretation of the plan.”). Tenth
Circuit: Cannon v. Group Health Serv., Inc., 77 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 1996)
(describing that the ambiguity present was the result of different
interpretations of the written Plan, not misrepresentations or intentional
ambiguity). Eleventh Circuit: Glass v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 33
F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Kane v. Aetna Life Ins., 893 F.2d 1283 (11th
Cir. 1990)) (holding that “the Eleventh Circuit [has] created a very narrow
common law doctrine under ERISA for equitable estoppel”). Additionally, the
mismanagement of the employer of records that related to eligibility of the
employee does not provide grounds for an equitable estoppel claim against the
insurance company providing the benefits. See also Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein,
Closing the Gap: Safeguarding Participants’ Rights by Expanding the Federal
Common Law of ERISA, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 671 (1994) (arguing that the federal
common law providing for equitable estoppel claims under ERISA provides the
greatest likelihood of success for employees who have been wronged by their
employers and have suffered harm as a result); Adam S. McGonigle, Note,
Applying Equitable Estoppel to ERISA Pension Benefit Claims, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 627 (2012) (arguing for a broader interpretation of “gross negligence”
and giving more credence to the reasonable reliance an employee may have
with her own employer).
82. The reason for high burden of proof is that ERISA plan sponsors are
typically “free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify or
terminate welfare plans.” Curtis-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73,
78 (1995). In Curtis-Wright, the employer, Curtis-Wright, issued a Summary
Plan Description (“SPD”) that informed its employees that coverage under
their health plan would “cease for retirees and their dependents upon the
termination of business operations of the facility from which they retired.” Id.
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retirees have met with limited success as they have struggled to
prove material misrepresentation by employers in connection
with changes to health care plans.83 For example, in Moore v.
Metropolitan Life84 the Second Circuit emphasized the centrality
of plan documents in these kinds of disputes.85 As Kaplan86 and
his co-authors have noted, the Moore court pointed out that
“absent a showing tantamount to proof of fraud, an ERISA
welfare plan is not subject to amendment as a result of informal

at 75. Shortly after this SPD was issued, Curtis-Wright closed a plant in New
Jersey. Id. at 76. Curtis-Wright maintained that this SPD was a proper
amendment of the retirement benefit process based upon language in the
original Plan documents that allowed Curtis-Wright the ability to “reserve[]
the right at any time and from time to time to modify or amend . . . any or all
provisions of the Plan.” Id. The Supreme Court held that the reservation
clause “sets forth a valid amendment procedure,” and ERISA is not designed
to facilitate a specific method by which this method is proper. Id. at 84-85.
Given the validity of these reservation clauses, employees must show a
material misrepresentation by the employer, reasonable and detrimental
reliance, and extraordinary circumstances. Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 236-38 (3d Cir. 1994). As the majority of decisions cited
above, the burden is substantial for the employees, and often times the written
agreement drafted by the employer is held as the binding document. See supra
notes 73 & 75 and accompanying text.
83. Vallone, 375 F. 3d at 639-40 (finding that the employees had not
shown a knowing misrepresentation of fact because the employer could have
had no actual intent of terminating the retirement benefit when it was offered,
and second, that the employees unreasonably ignored the reservation of rights
clauses in the retirement plan documents that “put them on notice that the
HCA benefit could be terminated or modified”); Hughes Aircraft v. Jacobson,
525 U.S. 432 (1999) (finding that misrepresentation of benefits to the employee
may be incidental and thus legitimate); Pisciotta, 91 F.3d at 1331 (reiterating
that the Ninth Circuit has two additional requirements for an ERISA
beneficiary to establish material misrepresentation from an employer: 1) the
provisions of the plan at issue must be ambiguous such that a reasonable
person could disagree as to their meaning or effect, and 2) oral representations
must be made to the employee involving an oral interpretation of the plan); In
re Unisys Corp., 58 F.3d 896, 907 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the employees
could not establish “reasonable detrimental reliance” on the employer’s
claims); Moore v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 856 F.2d 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding
that “absent a showing tantamount to proof of fraud, an ERISA welfare plan
is not subject to amendment as a result of informal communications between
an employer and plan beneficiaries”).
84. 856 F.2d. 488 (2d Cir. 1988). “Congress intended that plan documents
and the [Summary Plan Descriptions] exclusively govern an employer’s
obligations under ERISA plans.” Id. at 492.
85. See id.
86. Kaplan, supra note 5.

45

362

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:2

communications between an employer and plan beneficiaries.”87
In addition, meeting the burden of proof with respect to
detrimental reliance and extraordinary circumstances
frequently proves difficult albeit not impossible. In a rare
example of success, an employee demonstrated extraordinary
circumstances to the satisfaction of the Third Circuit in Smith v.
Hartford Ins. Group.88 Smith concerned an employee whose
wife suffered a cerebral hemorrhage which required skilled
nursing care and treatment.89 During this time the employer
switched to a self-funded plan that limited skilled care to 180
days.90 However, the employer repeatedly assured the employee
that the benefits under the new plan were identical to those of
the previous plan.91 The court noted that a genuine issue of
material fact prevented summary judgment as the employer’s
oral and written communications were ambiguous and that,
taken together, the employee had satisfied the requirement for
demonstrating “extraordinary circumstances.”92
With respect to allegedly oral modifications to plan terms
the circuit courts are nearly unanimous in their refusal to permit
oral promises to trump written plan language.93 For retirees
87. Id. at 328 (citing Moore, 856 F.2d at 492).
88. Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131, 134-35 (3d Cir. 1993)
(holding that summary judgment against the plaintiff’s estoppel claim was
inappropriate due to the repeated oral and written misrepresentations by the
defendant, the plaintiff’s diligent attempts to obtain answers about coverage,
and the large costs of the care).
89. Id. at 133.
90. Id. at 133-34.
91. Id. at 134.
92. Id. at 142. See Bloemker v. Laborers Local 265 Pension Fund, 605 F.3d
436 (6th Cir. 2010) (plaintiffs, an ERISA plan participant and his wife, sued
defendants alleging that the plan breached an agreement with him, that he
detrimentally relied on defendants’ misrepresentations and that they also
breached fiduciary duties owed to him under the plan. The Court concluded
that extraordinary circumstances existed where the plan administrator
certified erroneous early retirement pension amounts as correct and paid the
incorrect amount for 22 months); see also Abbruscato v. Empire Blue Cross &
Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2001) (remanding the estoppel claim back to
the District Court to determine if the employer held the retirement programs
out as an incentive to retire, if it had then this would be considered
extraordinary circumstances).
93. See, e.g., Ladouceur v. Credit Lyonnais, 584 F.3d 510 (2d Cir. 2009)
(citing the language of Perreca v. Gluck, 295 F.3d 215, 225 (2d Cir. 2002));
Perreca, 295 F.3d at 215 (holding that oral promises made by an employer are
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such as those in Tackett, this generally difficult legal standard,
combined with the absence of the Yard-Man inference, means
written contracts and ancillary documents will surely control the
outcome of retiree health litigation.
B.

Lifetime Benefits Not Uncommon

One of the curious features of the Tackett arrangement-a
long term practice of providing retiree health benefits for life in
the absence of explicit language enshrining the practice-is that
a review of recent Sixth Circuit cases makes it clear that what
would seem unthinkable now for economic reasons94 was
apparently quite common in many heavy manufacturing
industries up until recently. For example, shortly after the
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Tackett, Whirlpool Corp.
very publicly moved to reverse an adverse ruling in the Sixth
“unenforceable under ERISA and therefore cannot vary the terms of the
employer’s pension plan” (citing Smith v. Dunham-Bush, Inc., 959 F.2d 6, 7,
10 (2d Cir. 1992)); Bowerman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 226 F.3d 574 (7th Cir.
2000) (reiterating that the Court has repeatedly stressed that equitable
estoppel “cannot dilute the rule forbidding oral modifications to an ERISA
plan”); Frahm v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S., 137 F.3d 955 (7th Cir.
1998) (discussing that oral promises combined with a written plan could lead
to a worker getting twice the benefits as established, something contrary to
ERISA interpretation and contract law); Slice v. Sons of Norway, 34 F.3d 630
(8th Cir. 1994) (finding that failure to notify the employee of a rollover option
for his benefits constituted extra-contractual damages and was non
recoverable under ERISA); Dunham-Bush ,Inc., 959 F.2d at 6 (describing how
the employee conceded that the oral promise was unenforceable under ERISA);
de Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that the plan
itself is the defining source of a plaintiff’s claim, not material representations
that items such as plan summaries might include).
94. It is probably impossible to overstate the role of economic forces in
these retiree health cases. From the mid-1980s onward, as the cost of health
care escalated and the pressure to account for post-employment benefits
increased, both the bargaining process itself and the administration and
structure of these expensive ERISA plans were affected in a singular manner
by costs. As Joe Stuligross of the United Steelworkers noted, all of these cases
including Tackett really boil down to an “offer and ask” problem. He described
the years leading up to the litigation as “a problem [the cost of retiree health]
that neither side really wants to talk about.” Telephone Interview with Joe
Stuligross, United Steelworkers (May 7, 2015) (on file with author). He pointed
out that both the “employer and union clearly understood that this benefit was
for life . . . even when employees went on strike retirees continued to get their
free healthcare. This was clearly the intent and the plan was to control for
costs via the cap letters.” Id.
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Circuit on facts almost identical to those in Tackett. The Sixth
Circuit, in Zino v. Whirlpool Corp.95 had concluded that
Whirlpool owed a group of retirees lifetime health care
benefits.96 The Sixth Circuit determined that this was clearly
the intent of the parties97 and that the absence of clear and
95. Zino v. Whirlpool Corp., 47 F. Supp. 3d 561 (N.D. Ohio 2014).
96. The District Circuit provides a brief summary of the facts of the case,
but directs the reader to the summary judgment action brought by crossmotions from both parties. Zino v. Whirlpool Corp., No. 5:11CV01676, 2013
WL 4544518 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 2013). The retirees in this case were ones
that retired between 1980 and 2007 and were represented by the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local No. 1985 (“the Union”). Id. at *1.
Since 1971, the Union and Whirlpool entered into a series of CBAs in “two-,
three-, or five-year intervals.” Id. Prior to 1992, “each Welfare Plan explicitly
provided that company-sponsored healthcare benefits will end upon
retirement” and that the retirees “may continue medical coverage ‘at their own
expense.’” Id. In 1992, “a new Welfare Plan. . . . extended qualifying retiring
employees the ‘opportunity’ to receive company-paid healthcare after
retirement.” Id. Every subsequent Welfare Plan until 2007 recognized this
opportunity. Every retiree in the Zino lawsuit “has continued to receive
company-sponsored healthcare benefits.” Id. Changes in corporate structure
occurred during the negotiation of these CBAs, with many of the now Whirlpool
retirees originally working for Hoover, but Whirlpool sold Hoover to a Hong
Kong company, keeping the liabilities for the employee retirement plans as a
part of the deal. Id. at *2. In 2011, Whirlpool informed the retirees that it
would reduce their health care benefits in January 2013, and later extended it
to January 2014. Id. “Specifically, Whirlpool notified Medicare-eligible
retirees that company-paid supplemental health benefits will . . . have to be
individually purchased from private insurance companies. Whirlpool also
informed Retirees who were not Medicare-eligible that their health coverage
will ‘transition’ to the same plan as that provided to the majority of Whirlpool
retirees who are not eligible for Medicare.” Id. With these planned reductions
in coverage, “Whirlpool declared ’the right, at its discretion, to change or
terminate all or any part of the benefits offered at any time and in any
manner.’” Id. “Whirlpool does not dispute that [these] reductions . . . [will
result] in an approximately 75% decrease in estimated present value” of the
retiree’s benefit plans. Id.
97. Zino, 47 F. Supp. 3d at 583-84. According to the provision of the 1992
agreement, the eligibility of retirees “to receive company-paid health benefits
was unequivocally tied to their receipt of pension benefits. In order to continue
company insurance coverage during retirement, these Retirees must have
retired ‘under the terms of the Pension Plan’ and have had ‘at least ten years
of pension credit accumulated after attaining the age of 45 (or [have been] born
prior to December 31, 1937)[.]’” Id. at 569. The Court relies on Yard-Man
principles to emphasize that “[u]nder the Sixth Circuit vesting rules, this . . .
demonstrat[es] the parties’ intent to create vested healthcare benefits.” Id.
Testimony of various parties also indicated that, “‘the intent’ of the Company
and the Union was to negotiate an agreement that provided health benefits to
Retirees for life.” Id. at 571 (emphasis in original). Finally, the Court focuses
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express language did not forestall this conclusion.98
Likewise in USW v. Kelsey-Hayes,99 a case in which the
employer Kelsey-Hayes (later TRW) sent a letter to employees
informing them that it would discontinue group health care
coverage and instead provide Health Reimbursement Accounts
(HRAs),100 the same court noted that this change was essentially
a mechanism by which risk shifted from the employer to the
employees.
The HRAs differed from the prior group coverages
in that they shifted risk—and potentially costs—
off of the defendants and on to plaintiffs. At the
deposition of TRW Benefit Director Shelly
Iacobelli it was established that, under the HRAs,
plaintiffs ‘bear[] the risk of expenses that exceed
the company contribution[.]’ For example, as
Iacobelli confirmed, if a retiree spent $20,000 in
2012, the retiree would be responsible for the
$5,000 spent in excess of the $15,000 in his or her

on the fact that these benefits would continue after the expiration of the CBA,
which both Yard-Man and Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc. support. Id. at 578
(“the fact that retirees’ insurance benefits initially were continued after the
collective bargaining agreements expired … would be some evidence of the
parties’ intent”) (citing Weimer v. Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 773 F.2d 669, 676 n.6 (6th
Cir. 1985)). See UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1481 (6th Cir. 1983)
(“[company’s] own course of conduct in continuing retiree insurance benefits
after plant closure beyond the point as which insurance benefits could have
been terminated for active employees indicates that it did not consider retiree
benefits to be tied to the durational limitations of that active group”).
98. Id. at 4.
99. USW v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 750 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2014).
100. In 2012, Kelsey-Hayes switched its group coverage plans to “Health
Reimbursement Accounts” (HRAs). Id. at 550. “The HRAs were designed to
function, essentially as a health care voucher system” that TRW (the company
at the time) would make “‘a one-time contribution’” of “$15,000 for each eligible
retiree and his or her spouse.” Id. Then, as of 2013, “TRW would provide a
$4,800 credit into the HRAs . . . for each eligible retiree and eligible spouse . .
. The notion was that [employees] would then use these funds to purchase their
own insurance from among a variety of providers.” Id. The benefit of this
system was to “shift[] risk—and potentially costs—off of [TRW] and onto the
[employees].” Id. The benefit of this fixed system of payments was that the
employer would not be responsible for health care costs that went above the
fixed cost that went above the one time payment. Id. Additionally, TRW would
be able to predict and fix its costs related to these retiree benefits. Id.
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HRA.101
Noting that it found the employer’s assertion that the HRAs
would provide better coverage than the prior group coverage
“dubious”102 the Court noted that HRAs are simply not what the
parties bargained for.103 The Sixth Circuit noted, “we conclude
that the [collective bargaining agreements] established a vested
right to lifetime health care benefits, and that the unilateral
implementation of the HRAs breached [those contracts].”104
The prevalence of lifetime benefits in unionized,
manufacturing sectors of the economy 105 would seem to support
the main contention of the plaintiffs in Tackett: that the benefits
were so pervasive and so deeply ingrained that, combined with
past practice and the growing need to be careful about the
requirements of FAS 106, the lack of explicit language about
vesting is understandable. These facts, taken in light of the four
factors identified by the justices who signed onto the concurring
opinion in Tackett, are essentially all that the plaintiffs can point
to in support of their position. The explicit reliance though in

101. Id. at 550. This statement was made by the TRW Benefit Director,
and she admitted that this process shifted excess costs of healthcare to the
retirees, “as ‘that risk used to be borne by the insurance company’ under prior
group coverages.” Id.
102. Id. at 557.
103. “As described above, the HRAs were simply not what was collectively
bargained. The parties agreed in the CBAs that the retirees would get the
same type of coverage they had upon retirement, which in the case of these
retirees was group coverages with the full premium paid by the company.” Id.
104. Id. at 556. Note that Judge Merritt, concurring, pointed out that this
case is not about requiring the employer to provide health care benefits in the
same way forever; instead it is about an “employer [that] clearly violated its
legal obligations and should be required to pay the price of its recalcitrance.”
Id. at 561 (Merritt, J., concurring).
105. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULL. NO.
2589, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN PRIVATE
INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2005 (2007) (These tables provide various
breakdowns of benefit plans for various types of employees in the private sector
across different types of employment, including white collar and blue collar
workers); see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
SUMMARY NO. 08-03, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: RETIREMENT BENEFITS
IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2007 (2008) (Table
16 provides breakdowns of Post Retirement survivorship benefits of
government employees for various years of service and various levels of
coverage).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/1

50

2016

AFTER TACKETT

367

both the Whirlpool and Kelsey-Hayes cases on the now
disfavored Yard-Man inference will make it difficult to overcome
the new skepticism about vested retiree health care benefits
after Tackett.106
C. Regulatory Distortion and FAS 106
The behavior of plan sponsors in the private sector in
anticipation of and following the implementation of FAS 106 is
well documented.107 Thousands of employers modified existing
plans in order to provide for an acceptable balance sheet that
106. Both the Whirlpool and Kelsey-Hayes Courts rely on the Yard-Man
decision potentially to their detriment. Yard-Man explained that “retiree
benefits are in a sense ‘status’ benefits which, as such carry with them an
inference … that the parties likely intended those benefits to continue as long
as the beneficiary remains a retiree.” Zino v. Whirlpool Corp., 47 F. Supp. 3d
561, 566 (N.D. Ohio 2014) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting UAW v. YardMan, 716 F.2d 1476, 1479 (6th Cir. 1983)). However, “Yard-Man is properly
understood as creating an inference only if the context and other available
evidence indicate an intent to vest.” Id. The burden of proof does not shift to
the employer, and there is no requirement that employers use anti-vesting
language. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 750 F.3d at 552 (citing Mauer v. Joy Tech., Inc.,
212 F.3d 907, 915 (6th Cir. 2000)). Yard-Man is also influential “for its
instruction to ‘look to other provisions of the agreement for guidance’ when the
explicit language is ambiguous as to [the parties’] intent”. Zino, 47 F. Supp.
3d at 566 (quoting Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 654 (6th Cir.
1996)). Yard-Man and its subsequent cases instruct Courts to simply “apply
ordinary principles of contract interpretation.” Kelsey-Hayes, 750 F.3d at 554.
The Whirlpool Court focuses on the fact that the retirees from the 1980-1983
have continued to receive their benefits after the CBA expired. Zino, 47 F.
Supp. 3d at 566. This factor leads the Court to believe the Yard-Man
presumption should act “like a thumb on the scales” for the employees. Id.
Similarly, the Court in Kelsey-Hayes cites that Kelsey-Hayes had promised the
retirees “’the continuance of the healthcare coverages that he or she had … at
the time of retirement.’” Kelsey-Hayes, 750 F.3d at 554. Further, Kelsey-Hayes
had agreed to pay “the full premium or subscription charge for health care
coverages continued in accordance” with other sections of the CBA. Id. The
Court found this language unambiguous, and under the Yard-Man
presumption, there was a vested lifetime right to health care benefits. Id.
Indeed, the Yard-Man principles have caused the Sixth Circuit to vacate and
remand the Kelsey-Hayes case to the District Court. USW v. Kelsey-Hayes Co.,
795 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. 2015). However, Judge Merritt dissented with this
decision, stating that “Kelsey-Hayes employees who are retired are entitled to
vested health care benefits under the collective bargaining agreements.” Id.
(Merritt, J., dissenting).
107. FIN.
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS
N O.
106
(1990),
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=12182201236
71&acceptedDisclaimer=true.
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would take into account the cost of promises made for future
payments as required. Likewise, an argument could be made
that the changes in the public sector, which were triggered by
GASB 45,108 were even more dramatic. Numerous state and
local government employers have been forced to reckon with the
size and scope of benefits that had been promised to public
employees—often without much thought to the future cost to
taxpayers.109 Indeed, some states are still trying, very publicly,
to come to terms with the cost of post-employment benefits that
threaten to crowd out all other spending.110 In the private sector,
108. GOV’T ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL
REPORTING BY EMPLOYERS FOR POSTEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN
PENSIONS
(2004),
http://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Document_C/GASBDocumentPage?cid=11761
59988899&acceptedDisclaimer=true.
109. “[P]olitical actors, often in exchange for promises of support at the
polls, commit to more generous benefits than the taxpayers can realistically
afford.” Legislators generally realize they have various other commitments in
addition to pensions, and these “generally require immediate spending in order
to satisfy the public’s demand for services.” Maria O’Brien Hylton, The Case
for Public Pension Reform: Early Evidence from Kentucky, 47 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 585, 596 (2014).
110. Illinois is currently facing a pension crisis that has been exacerbated
by the fact that the Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that the attempted
pension reforms violated the Pension Protection Clause of the Illinois State
Constitution. In re Pension Reform Litigation, 32 N.E.3d 1 (Ill. 2015).
However, State officials have claimed that extreme measures are necessary to
curtail the long period of spending and excessive promises made to government
workers. Monica Davey, Illinois Supreme Court Rejects Lawmakers’ Pension
Overhaul,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(May
8,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/09/us/illinois-supreme-court-rejectslawmakers-pension-overhaul.html. Given the amount of pensions promised,
Illinois is expecting a 6 billion dollar budget deficit. This occurred because for
several decades, Illinois has promised pensions but did not balance the budget
or ensure that these pension plans would be funded as they spent money
elsewhere, even as the obligations rose. Monica Davey & Mary Williams
Walsh, Pensions and Politics Fuel Crisis in Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, (May 25, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/26/us/politics/illinois-pensioncrisis.html?_r=0;
Illinois
Pension
Obligations,
KHAN
ACADEMY,
https://www.khanacademy.org/humanities/history/American%20civics/americ
an-civics/v/illinois-pension-obligations (last visited Oct. 7, 2015). Chicago in
particular has seen its credit rating downgraded to junk status by Moody’s
Investor’s Service. Monica Davey, Illinois: Chicago’s Credit Rating is
Downgraded,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(May
12,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/13/us/illinois-chicagos-credit-rating-isdowngraded.html. As the state continues to deliberate how to fund these
pensions, Rahm Emmanual, the mayor of Chicago, has asked for the Teacher’s
union to allow the city to forestall 500 million dollars of payments due at the
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especially in workplaces without unions, reductions in retiree
healthcare were swift and often unchallenged.111
Many
employers simply eliminated retiree health coverage
altogether.112
If the explanation provided by the Tackett plaintiffs is
accurate, their story is essentially one of a different, but
understandable response. While the public sector continues to
grapple with the fallout from GASB 45 and its implications for
municipal bankruptcy,113 and non-unionized employers made
fairly nimble adjustments as required by FAS 106 to their
benefit plans,114 the Tackett story (and that of the plaintiffs in
the Whirlpool and Kelsey-Hayes cases) is likewise a slightly
modified tale of adjustment. Lacking the ability to make
unilateral changes to benefit plans that characterizes the
beginning of next year. Mark Peters & Michelle Hackman, Chicago Cuts 1,400
Jobs as Pension Fight Drags On, WALL ST. J., (July 1, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/chicago-cuts-1-400-jobs-as-pension-fight-dragson-1435791297. Further, this continued stalemate between the employees and
the state has led to the possibility of a partial government shutdown, especially
in light of the Illinois Supreme Court decision. Id.; see also RACHEL BARKLEY,
THE STATE OF STATE PENSION PLANS 2013: A DEEP DIVE INTO SHORTFALLS AND
SURPLUSES
(Morningstar
2013),
http://images.mscomm.morningstar.com/Web/MorningstarInc/%7B43f240a04c8f-47b5-bc01-45cbc9e9d33b%7D_StateofStatePensionsReport2013.pdf.
111. From 1993 to 1994, the percentage of large companies “offering
benefits to retirees eligible for Medicare fell from 40% to 21%.” David A. Pratt,
The Past, Present and Future of Retiree Health Benefits, 3 J. HEALTH &
BIOMEDICAL L. 103, 122 (2007).
112. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73 (1995)
(recognizing that the company could be properly identified as an individual
who could amend the benefit plans under ERISA); James E. Holloway &
Douglas K. Schneider, ERISA, FASB, and Benefit Plan Amendments: A
Section 402(b)(3) Violation as a Loss Contingency for a Plan Amendment, 46
DRAKE L. REV. 97, 115-17 (1997).
113. See generally Maria O’Brien Hylton, Central Falls Retirees v.
Bondholders: Assessing Fear of Contagion in Chapter 9 Proceedings, 59 WAYNE
L. REV. 525 (2013).
114. Susan E. Cancelosi, The Bell is Tolling: Retiree Health Benefits PostHealth Reform, 19 ELDER L.J. 49, 64 (2011) (describing how many private
sector employers discovered that their promises of retiree health benefits
nearly matched or exceeded their total asset value); Larry Grudzien, The Great
Vanishing Benefit, Employer Provided Retiree Medical Benefits: The Problem
and Possible Solutions, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 785, 786 (2006) (describing how
some companies immediately recognized the expense of retiree health benefits
and cut retiree medical benefits instantly as justified by the financial
statements).
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unorganized private sector and also the messy political process
that has at times paralyzed the public sector,115 private,
unionized workplaces, as they so often do, settled on repeated,
short term fixes that would appear to satisfy shareholders, keep
the company profitable and provide retirees with benefits they
had every reason to believe they were entitled to.
The cap letters and the inexplicable silence about vesting
make the most sense when understood as a response to a painful
move toward more transparency that made lifetime promises of
any sort seem ridiculously expensive. Many of the modern
changes to post-employment benefits are rightly attributed to
employers reacting to GASB 45 or to FAS 106. It makes sense
to view the relationship between the parties in Tackett through
the same lens-indeed, it would be peculiar to think that the
widespread changes buffeting all employers as they struggle
with rising health care costs somehow were irrelevant to
unionized manufacturers like M & G Polymers.116
115. See supra note 110 for a discussion of how Illinois has faced years of
public sector inaction and controversy that has now led to a pension crisis in
the public sector. California has begun feeling the pressure to reform its
pension system with two cities now filing for bankruptcy, however, unions
representing public sector employees have “vehemently defended the status
quo, saying these benefits were promised to workers for years of serving the
public.” Marc Lifsher, California Pension Funds are Running Dry, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-controller-pensionwebsite-20141114-story.html. Further, the California Public Employees’
Retirement System (“CalPERS”) has recently been criticized in the bankruptcy
proceedings of the city of Stockton. Melody Peterson, California Public
Workers May be at Risk of Losing Promised Pensions, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17,
2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-pension-controversy-20150317story.html. The Judge criticizes CalPERS “as ‘a ‘bully’ for weighing in on the
[bankruptcy] proceedings to insist … that the city had no choice but to pay
workers their promised pensions.” Id. Rhode Island has also struggled to
reform its pension system after making years of promises to its public
employees, but these reforms could save about four billion dollars while still
allowing the retirement system to continue. Svea Herbst-Bayless, Rhode
Island Argues in Court for Sweeping Pension Reform Approval, REUTERS (May
20,
2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/20/usa-rhodeislandpensions-idUSL1N0YB0RY20150520. Additionally, action from the courts
was necessary to allow Governor Christie to cut over one billion dollars from
the New Jersey pension system. Megan Davies & Jonathan Stempel, New
Jersey Governor Christie Wins Court Victory Over Pension Cuts, REUTERS (June
9,
2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/09/us-usa-new-jerseypensions-idUSKBN0OP0CA20150609.
116. The growth of healthcare expenses has risen across the world, but
the United States has grown far more rapidly than similar countries around
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That an employer and a union with a long relationship and
a shared goal of presenting to shareholders the best possible
balance sheet would opt for strategic silence seems entirely
reasonable. Silence was completely unnecessary in the nonunionized private sector where employers could generally
implement the changes they sought with little or no consultation
with employees; in the public sector, whose unions vigorously
opposed GASB 45117 silence was impossible once the public
the world. Snapshots: Health Care Spending in the United States & Selected
OECD Countries, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/healthcosts/issue-brief/snapshots-health-care-spending-in-the-united-statesselected-oecd-countries/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2015). In 1980, the United States
was roughly equivalent to Sweden in healthcare costs per capita, but now
spends more than $3,000 more per capita on healthcare expenses. Id. at
Exhibit 3. Interestingly, this is also $3,000 greater than the United States was
spending per capita in 2008, and roughly twice as much per capita as the global
average. Id. at Exhibit 4B. Additionally, the growth of United States
healthcare spending is a “clear outlier” to many other highly developed
countries. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., The Effect of Health Care
Cost
Growth
on
the
U.S.
Economy
3
(2007),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/08/healthcarecost/report.pdf; see also The
History of Health Care Spending in 7 Graphs, WASH. POST.,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-history-of-health-carespending-in-7-graphs/2012/01/09/gIQAFlCCmP_gallery.html (last visited Oct.
7, 2015).
117. “The unions said that if governments were forced to disclose the cost
of their plans, they would probably cut or drop them, just as companies have
done.” Milt Freudenheim & Mary Williams Walsh, The Next Retirement Time
Bomb,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
11,
2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/11/business/yourmoney/the-next-retirementtime-bomb.html. Forcing governments to confront the amount promised to
future retirees is a process that will help the government ascertain costs for
programs promised but not accounted for. Id. Some unions have taken the
position that the financial accounting rules are “being used to promote and
enforce a corporate political agenda, the ending of retiree benefits.” The Attack
on Pensions and Retirees Heats Up: GASB, UNITED ELEC., RADIO & MACH.
WORKERS OF AM., http://www.ueunion.org/stwd_gasbfasb.html (last visited
Oct. 7, 2015). In 2005, the president of the American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees “promised a fight if GASB is used to
eliminate retiree health care.” Ronald A. Wirtz, Gasping over GASB, FED.
RESERVE
BANK
OF
MINNEAPOLIS
(May
1,
2006),
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/fedgazette/gasping-over-gasb. In
Costa County, California, the International Federation of Professional and
Technical Engineers has sued the county for capping its current county
healthcare limits, which has resulted in going “against the spirit of the
negotiated language” because the county is worried about their “bond rating”
and the “appear[ance] to hav[ing] greater liabilities on their books.” Mike
Seville, Unions Seek Creatively, Financially Sound Solutions to Protect Retiree
Healthcare, TWENTY ONE, Winter 2014, at 4-5 (Twenty One is the quarterly
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learned of the extraordinarily generous benefits that its tax
dollars were supporting.118
In the shrinking private and organized part of the economy
though, strategic silence was a perfectly reasonable response,
albeit a risky one for retirees. If the Sixth Circuit on remand
focuses carefully on the four factors identified by the justices
who wrote in concurrence, there is a reasonable likelihood that
the Tackett plaintiffs (the current retirees) will hold onto their
free health care benefits.
The parties’ long history of bargaining, combined with the
industry specific practice of cap letters and side agreements,119
and other extrinsic evidence that suggests the retirees’ reliance
was not misplaced and that both parties almost certainly
understood what was really going on. The major obstacle to a
“win” for the Tackett retirees is not common and widely accepted
rules of contract interpretation, Yard-Man notwithstanding.
The central problem is that employers like M & G Polymers
simply cannot afford to honor the promises they made implicitly
and which they did honor for a long time.
Justice Thomas’ opinion in Tackett is not so much a rejection
of Yard-Man (although it certainly sidelines that decision) as it
is a practical way out of a problem that threatens to overwhelm
many employers. The obvious solution for retirees in nonphysically demanding industries is to remain employed until at
least age 65 when Medicare eligibility is triggered.120 For those
who simply cannot continue to work past age 50 or 55 (a not
uncommon reality in mining, steel, auto and other
publication of IFPTE Local 21).
118. While there is difficulty computing the exact value of government
employee pensions, “the average public pension is several times more generous
than 401(k)-style plans in the private sector.” Jason Richwine, The Real Cost
of Public Pensions, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (May 31, 2012),
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/05/the-real-cost-of-publicpensions.
119. See supra note 18 (referring to exhibits admitted into evidence for
the Tackett litigation).
120. “Every individual who . . . (2) has attained age 65 and is a resident
of the United States, and is either (A) a citizen or (B) an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence who has resided in the United States continuously
during the 5 years immediately preceding the month in which he applies for
enrollment under this part, is eligible to enroll in the insurance program
established by this part.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395o(2).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss2/1

56

2016

AFTER TACKETT

373

manufacturing jobs)121 some sort of legislative solution is
required to fill the new gap. The catch of course is that the
Medicare program’s finances are already shaky122 and the
political will needed to expand the program is not certain.123
V.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s recent unanimous decision in Tackett
rejects the Yard-Man inference which only ever enjoyed limited
121. Injuries present in these professions similar to the steel and mining
industry could lead to necessary retirement due to workplace related injuries,
disabilities, and even death. Highest Incidence Rates of Total Nonfatal
Occupational Injury and Illness Cases, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (2013),
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/osh/os/ostb3962.pdf (referencing Table SNR01,
titled Highest Incident Rates of Total Nonfatal Occupational Injury and Illness
Cases); National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2013 (Preliminary
Results),
BUREAU
OF
LABOR
STATISTICS
(Sept.
17,
2014),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cfoi.pdf (referencing Chart 2, showing
that while the mining industry had decreased in number of fatal workplace
incidents, it still reported one of the highest rates of employee death on the
job).
122. Susan A. Channick, Taming the Beast of Health Care Costs: Why
Medicare Reform Alone is Not Enough, 21 ANNALS OF HEALTH L. 63, 66-68
(2012); Jacqueline Fox, Death Panels: A Defense of the Independent Payment
Advisory Board, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 135-38 (2014); Thomas L. Greaney,
Controlling Medicare Costs: Moving Beyond Inept Administered Pricing and
Ersatz Competition, 6 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 229, 230-31 (2013);
Sharon R. Kaufman, Medicare’s Next Half-Century, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2015),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/medicares-next-halfcentury/; Sally C. Pipes, Medicare at 50: Hello, Mid-Life Crisis, WALL ST. J.
(July 29, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/medicare-at-50-hello-mid-lifecrisis-1438211061; Michael D. Shear & Robert Pear, Older Pool of Health Care
Enrollees Stirs Fears on Costs, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 13, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/14/us/health-care-plans-attracting-moreolder-less-healthy-people.html; The Times Editorial Board, Medicare and
Medicaid at 50: Successful, Expensive, L.A. TIMES (July 30, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-medicare-medicaid-5020150730-story.html; Christopher Weaver et al., Medicare Overpays as
Hospital
Prices
Rise,
WALL
S T.
J.
(Apr.
15,
2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/medicare-overpays-as-hospital-prices-rise1429151451.
123. See supra note 109; see also Robert Pear, U.S. Proposes Cuts to Rates
in
Medicare
Payments,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
21,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/22/us/politics/us-proposes-cuts-to-rates-inmedicare-payments.html; Medicare Advantage, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (June 29, 2015), http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/medicareadvantage/ (citing that Medicare Advantage plans could largely be at the
whims of private companies operating these types of plans).
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support outside of the Sixth Circuit. The central contribution of
the opinion is its clear reaffirmation that traditional principles
of contract interpretation—the primacy of unambiguous
language, the role of industry specific customs and the
availability of extrinsic evidence in light of ambiguity—apply in
cases where the parties have failed to be explicit and, in doing
so, essentially gambled about future litigation. For the Tackett
plaintiffs-current retirees who are, by definition not well suited
to obtaining new employment and/or alternate sources of
employer-based health insurance-the only moderately optimistic
way forward requires a coherent explanation of the years of
silence surrounding an important and increasingly expensive
benefit.
The story needs to include an explanation of the years long
practice of not talking about the unacknowledged but well
understood expectation of retirees that their benefits would
always be free and would last for life. The role of the cap letters
as a mechanism for controlling risk will be critical to this
process. If the retirees can characterize their own strategic
behavior as a calculated response to the post FAS 106 world—a
world that was materially different from the experience of
unorganized workers in the private sector—they will maximize
the chances of holding on to their employer sponsored health
care.
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